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Abstract

The fundamental

concepts

of any discipline ought to be examined

periodically, not only to understand what constitutes those principles
or concepts but
logically and

also

to ensure

that

our basic assumptions are

empirically acceptable.

This thesis calls for the

reexamination of the concept of the "individual" and of

its role as

the basic or fundamental unit of human society. Two suggestions are
made as indications that possible
consistent with

alternative views are logically

the data presently

at

our

suggestion is that the concept of the individual
was

formed

largely as

is

that

The first

in Western culture

a by-product of a theological development of

salvation or redemption in
suggestion

disposal.

the Judeo-Christian ethos.

the basic

The second

or fundamental human unit is not the

familiar concept of the "individual" but that of a "biological whole"
consisting

of

the mating pair

or the male and the female, and the

child. Whereas the "individual" concept is related to the idea of the
responsibility

to, and

the worship

"biological whole" concept

is based

of, God by

each soul, the

on man's genetic and social

inheritance.

The inheritance of the "biological whole" includes both the purely
biological aspects and the psychical aspects. Man as an animal

is

genetically predisposed toward the maintenance and the transmission of
life.

Considering

the

sexual

structure of man, any predisposition

must include an attraction for "members
other

words, in order

for

of

the opposite

sex".

In

life to continue from one generation to

another, because the male or female is incomplete without the opposite
member, a "whole" must include both. Such an orientation
whole

in the purely biological

aspect

a

of man can be used as the

foundation for a psychically organic concept. Carl Jung's
the "collective

toward

theory of

unconscious" can be readily adapted to descibe how

such an organic theory would work.

The "collective unconscious" is an

inherited part of the psyche which permeates the other two layers of
the psyche:the personal unconscious, and the conscious. Both layers
of the unconscious form the basis for the organic concept of mind
society.

and

This

thesis

is more

of

a plea

than

an analysis, a measured

argument or a diatribe. The plea is to those who use the forms I have
mentioned, for much of what people accept
learned papers

and

in everyday

as "factual" and use

life as

a "fact" ought

in

to be

re-examined with a critical eye. "Democracy", for instance, is a word
or concept often used by political scientists and commentators in the
same "factual" manner as biologists use "Ciconia ciconia". However,
the biologist can go on to describe

the "Ciconia

ciconia" as

the

European white stork, and provide a detailed list of specifications of
what

constitutes

a European white stork and it is a list accepted by

any other biologist.
specifications
the word

S.I. Hayakawa,

dismisses

any

list

of

for "democracy". He has stated that when someone uses

"democracy" that its "factual" content is so minimal

its value

and

load is so great that to say "Lichtenstein is a democracy"

is to indicate merely that the

speaker

approves

of

its system

of

government and very little more.

One

concept

that must

be

a keystone in the foundation of most

political philosophy and theory is that of the individual.
of

To

speak

the state, of society, of culture, of community, of the nation, of

the clan, of government , of authority, of freedom, rights, liberties
and justice, of the public good and private interests, in fact, almost
any social principle, one must be able to give a definition of both
the individual and the supra- individual entity and the
between

relationship

them and between individuals. Too often a commonly accepted

(and sometimes vague) viewpoint is assumed and much

of

the analysis
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and

theory

is based

assumed many
developed

on unknown and unexamined principles. We have

times, in Western philosophy, that

the principles

in Europe over the last five hundred years are universally

held, or would be

should

other

cultures

attain our advantage of

knowing the truth.

There are two purposes in this thesis: one, in section one, is to
trace the development

in Western European culture of the concept of

the individual as the basic human unit. The other, in sections two
and

three, suggests another, more accurate basic human unit which is

not that of the individual nor that of a holistic societal or communal
unit in the traditional sense. Political philosophy examines a human
universe and

it

is

the human-in-the- world we take as a seminal or

embryonic starting point in both sections

two and three. As such, in

order to present another view of the basic human unit, we
examine

the biological

aspects

to

of man first and determine what

biological principles are involved in the development
examination, therefore, must

ought

of man.

This

be historical and descriptive because

most of the biological development of man

is beyond the empirical

scope of the scientific method.

Section one of this paper attempts to accomplish the first purpose
by

tracing

the historical

development

of

the concept

of the

"individual" from earliest times through to the reformation and

the
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contract

theorists.

At

first the "individual" as a concept did not

exist in the minds of the tribesmen, nor did the word exist
languages.

Distinctions

about

fundamental

could not be

thought

various

revolutions

in many

the "individual" which we feel are
of

by

other

in thought, culture and

cultures.
language

Through

the basic

concept, i.e. the individual as we know it, evolved and we find that
"the

individual person

is

the center of the value system."1. These

revolutions in thought accompanied theological developments in thought
and culture and it is the argument that as one traces the development
of

Judeo-Christian

development of an
relationship

ethos, one of

individual

the tendencies has been the

soul, responsibility, salvation, and

to God. According to the teleological requirements, the

"individual" acquired

attributes which would

suit

the

newest

theological views. For the concept of the individual, the high point
in the theological development was the reformation and
placed

the emphasis

on each individual's priestly authority and his responsibility

to God alone. The political
theological

development.

individual

to God.

the

Then as the hold of religion weakened, the

"Agnostic" God of the Eighteenth
responsibility

is the by-product of

Locke's

century

removed

individual

the

individual's

is responsible

to or

subject to the authority of his own judgment or reason alone. It was
the religious
clans, the

tendencies that
tribes, the

institutions, until

loosed the authoritative hold of the

states, the church, and other

social

only God himself and the individual were left as

4

existent social concepts. By the time of Kant, Bentham
reason or man's

and Godwin,

own judgment was the supreme seat of authority--the

only existent social concept.

Before any attempt is made to examine the historical
of

the

development

individual, some attempt should be made to discover what the

modern concept

of

the

individual

entails and

what,

if

any,

characteristics

are commonly held as intrinsic to such a concept. In

the introductory chapter, one tries to point out various principles or
attributes that are associated most often with

the concept

individual."

Notes

1. Dubos, Reve. Of Human Diversity. New York: Clark
University Press, 1974, p. 10.

of "the
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Introduction

Political science is a strange discipline in that the area of
study

its

is known, i.e., man and his relationship to man, but the object

of its scrutiny is unidentified. A chemist knows exactly what he is
examining, as does the astronomer, the zoologist and the geographer.
By "knowing", I mean that there are certain definite laws, principles,
or parameters to the subject matter
belonging

that he

studies.

The problem

to the humanities is that we are examining ourselves and we

don't know who we are or what we are. We

don't

even know what

is

intrinsic and what is not. Do we have free will? are we rational? are
we autonomous? do we have a soul? is the " I " me or in possession of
me? do we have rights? Many more questions of a similar nature can be
listed.

In this paper, however, I want to examine what must be the

primary question

for

the political scientist and that is: When we

examine the "man-world", is what we examine as the basic
separate,

autonomous,

or

unique

conglomerate, total, inseparable

unit

(1) a

individual, (2) a holistic,

or, social "man-thing", or

(3)
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something

in between, such as a group, a family, an association, or a

community. This paper is, in fact, an examination of the concept
the

of

individual: to show how the concept evolved, what the concept is

today, how the concept should be used, and whether or not the concept
has any meaning to the political scientist.

The major
problem of
"other".

stumbling

block to philosophical thought today is the

solipsism, or how does one reach from
An

example

of

the result

the " I " to the

of this strain is Robert Paul

Wolff's statement:

The defining mark of the state is authority, the
right to rule. The primary obligation of man is
autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. It would seem,
then, that there can be no resolution of the
conflict between autonomy...
and the putative
authority of the state. 1.
Hobbes and

Locke, starting as individualists, but with different

views of the individual, tried to resolve that "conflict" and
with

theories anathema to each other. The major schools and theories

today are attempts to bridge the chasm of solipsism by redefining
concept

of

the individual.

These

Stirner

and other

(e.g., Max

extreme anarchists) to the more complex egoism of

some existentialism (e.g., Jean- Paul Sartre), to the more
inadequate

the

attempts have ranged from the

extreme of accepting egoism and allowing for nothing more

yet

ended

theories

collective

of Marxism and Thomism, to the more extreme
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mass concept of the idealists like Gentile and the Fascists and
"totalism"

of

some

totalitarian

ideologies.

the

In other words, the

answers have ranged frcm ignoring everything but oneself (Stirner) to
ignoring

the

individual

(Naziism).

Yet, no matter how logical the

theories may be, there is a sense of inadequacy that must strike every
thoughtful examiner.

It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to

examine the various theories in turn to find out what

is inadequate.

That project is probably beyond the scope of any one examiner.

When

someone speaks of the individual, one has to ask for greater

explanations
accumulated

to understand precisely what he
quite a

"individuality"
attributes

of

variety

(which seem
the other).

of

means.

relational

spring of

egotistic

attributes:

to be

interchangeable

or

dominating

"Individuals are units that have rights";

existence"; and
desire".

uniqueness,

have

definitions of "individual" and of

"Ontological concept of man has the concrete being of
and his

I

The

reason,

the

individual

the individual is a "centre or
individual has any number
will, material, moral

of

unity,

originality, historicity, independence, autonomy, unity, relationality
(or the focus of relations), creativity and so on.
also described
Expressions

not

such as

self-regulating

Individuals are

so much by what they are but by what they do.
self-expression

of

intent,

self-assertion,

system, self-determinism, are common. The individual

is subject i.e. acts on, for objects; the individual projects himself;
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the individual lives his being, all indicating that there
definition

is no one

of "individual" or that he is goal oriented, and that to

know what the individual is, an observer must do his best to see
individual

in practice.

the

It is an open concept yet others insist on a

more closed concept such as "self-sufficing", "self-subsistent", etc.
it is confusing and disturbing.

In investigating the relationships between the
individual and society, our point of departure only an empirical one - is the individual man; he
thinks and acts and always co-operates with others
within some social framework, but is a distinct
individual.... When the individual is treated as
the starting point of our analysis we must not
forget that his autonomy is only relative. This is
not a mysterious monad of will and consciousness,
isolated and deprived of contact with others; this
is a social individual, because, unable to live
without society, he is - since the moment of birth
- shaped by_ society and is its product physically
and spiritually.2.
It is interesting that Adam Schaff is unable to state what
he

is talking

about, except

it is

in negative tones. The individual is

distinct yet acts and thinks socially: he is an individual empirically
yet his autonomy is only relative, and he is unable

to live without

society, etc. He seems to be using individualistic terms holistically.
In this

section, I want

to

take a look at this being who is both

distinct and not distinct at the same time.
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The word "individual" comes
meaning

"indivisible",

from

the Latin word "individuus"

i.e., "not-to-divide". As an adjective it has

the following meanings:

1. Existing as a unit; single. 2. Separate, as
distinguished
from
others of the same kind;
particular: "individual" voters. 3. pertaining to
or meant for a single person, animal, etc.: an
"individual" serving.
4. Differentiated
from
others by peculiar or distinctive characteristics:
an individual style. 5. Obsolete
Incapable of
being divided; inseparable.
And as a noun:
1. A single human being as distinct from others.
2. A person.
3. Biol. a. A plant or animal
existing and functioning independently, b. A single
member of a compound organism, especially one
forming part of a hydrozoan colony. - Although
"individual"
is often used as a synonym for
"person" many careful writers use it only when
there is emphasis upon individuality or when a
single person is in contrast with a body: The
members of a group are also "individuals". 3.
From

such a series of definitions, we can pick out certain tendencies

or concepts that
dominate-

the word "individual" contains.

Two

tendencies

"separateness", and, "completeness". Adam Schaff tries to

impress the distinction between the two concepts on the mind
reader.

For

him

the

individual

of

the

is "distinct", i.e., he has

separate-qualities that set one apart from others, yet the

individual

is "social", i.e., unable to live without society. However, he adds a
third

concept "Autonomy"

i.e.

"self-governing", claiming that the

individual's "autonomy" is relative and linked to his "distinctness".
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Schaff also notes that the empirical starting point for the concept of
the

individual

is

the "separateness" or "distinctness" linked to or

synonymous with "autonomy".

The Thomists, such as Jacques
"individual" can be defined

Mar i tain,

as being

horse, man, angel, stone) while

claim

that

the

distinct from others (tree,

a "person"

is an

individual

of

rational or intellectual nature (man or angel) and a "human person" is
an individual of a human rational nature.4. In such a classification,
the purely material

or

empirical considerations of the first level

relate to "distinctness" or "separateness", while

the next

category

relates to "autonomy" (Reason being the prime necessity for autonomy).
The

"person" is capable

of

responsibility

(whereas

the

simple

"individual" is not) and "freedom" is the distinguishing mark of man's
nature.5. For the Thomist, and
foundation, reason and

for Kant,6

autonomy has, as

its

is, in turn, the foundation for morals. The

"person", the social, moral, ethical, conceptual aspect of human kind,
is distinguised by "freedom", a free choice, or as Jaspers puts it,
the

liberty

or

power

of

"self-transcendence". 7.

Heidegger's

"lived-world" concept also expresses the idea of the "person" working
on a canvass of material things of which the "self" or the empirical
individual human is one.
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Emmanuel Mounier and Thomas Hobbes speak of
negative,

atomistic,

egoistic

tones.

the "individual" in

Mounier

adds that the

"individual" is the selfish, materialistic personality

isolated by

matter, while the "person" is the moral, spiritual human kind, having
conquered

the mere

existentialists

and

"self". For Mounier, Maritain, Jaspers, the
others, the distinction between "individual" and

"person" (or similar terms) does not result in two distinct beings. By
reason, or autonomy, or free choice etc., the "person" transcends

the

"individual" but in no way separates from the "individual".

Now, we have four

concepts

that, unfortunately, are often viewed

synonymously: the individual has individuality, personality, autonomy
and

being. At

this point, the Thomist, the existentialists, and

others, would try to unravel the definitional problem by
concept

of "Freedom" and

examination of

the nature

assumptions about

applying

it

circular argument. We must try

the

to human kind. However, the

of "freedom" already

the human being

examing

includes several

and so we possibly can end in a

to deal with

the concept

of "the

individual" itself.

There are two concepts "individual" and "individuality" which are
often treated synonomously and at other times not.
used

in many ways:

Individuality is

it is those traits that distinguish one person or

thing from others; or it is the state of having separate, independent
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existence. However, authors use "individuality" in a great variety of
ways, from physical separateness:
...individuality means the presence of barriers and
boundaries, a radical otherness with respect to
individual centers and foci. Individuality denotes
that which
limits, impedes, and
disrupts
homogeneity and continuity. 8.
to the personality in a physical being:

...individuality
is
the personality vis-a-vis
society and the state. Individuality is the sign
of the persona, and it always finds its claims in
the higher sanctions of the latter. 9.
Individuality

when it

is identified

as "the possession

of

distinctiveness by members of the human family" 10 i.e., a variety of
uniqueness or as a "psychosocial phenomenon involving a complex set of
interactions between the normalizing influences of
and the

the social

group

innate or acquired drive to be oneself," 11 has a similarity

to the Thomist definition of the person.

The

individuality

is an

achievement of life processess or the social persona which is involved
with the more material

individual.

The

individual

has the more

metaphysical sense of being a separate and distinct existence. It

is

the "thing" and "individuality" is the personality or the truly human
part of man. It is the individuality that provides man

the

logical

and moral unity that allows him to be an end in himself and not means
for something else. "Individiuality", then, is the basis for

that
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which

is uniquely human, and uniqueness, as I will point out, is a

variety of the concept of
"individuality"
person, then

autonomy.

On

is related more to the physical aspects than to the
it

takes

on a

different

"apartness", "distinctness", are more
meaning.
aspect

the other hand, whenever

value.

akin to its non- personality

In this paper, I .shall use autonomy
of

"Separateness",

for

the personality

individuality, and individual for the more physical aspect

of individuality.

"Uniqueness" has
charactersitics

or

contains will never
genetic

the tone of
the

set of

reoccur

unrepeatability,

that the

characterstics which one individual

again.

structure, the mental

i.e.

The physical

predispositions

appearance, the

and processes , the

memories and experiences will never occur exactly as they are
person.

For

that

in one

reason, many believe we will never know what the

human individual is because each is different from the others. When I
look at my hands, I
right, yet

recognize that the left

is different

is unique and

I hadn't

geologist studies but one piece of
grounds

the

I would not treat a broken finger in the left hand while

leaving a broken finger in the right untreated
each

from

that

each is unique.

studied

on the grounds

that

the right hand finger. No

granite and not others on the
Research

scientists do not study

tuberculosis in each and every person on the grounds that each person
or

individual

is unique. If a child is born without arms, we do not
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say of that child he is not human
species, yet he would

or

be unique.

individual is described as "unique"?

that he
What

then

is of a

different

is meant when the

The fact that no two people have

the same fingerprints, voiceprints, or brainwave patterns may be
useful

cateloguing people or things but does little to help the study

of man. It would be hard to find
identical

anything

in this world

that

is

in everyway (except time and space) to another thing yet we

seldom bother to think of the minute differences when collecting

new

stamps or new coins, or when we examine a type of bacteria or virus.

When asked what an author means by "uniqueness" in human beings, I
am

sure

that not

one

of

them would demonstrate the uniqueness of

fingerprints or elbows or hair numbers in the scalp. It
that

they would

suggest physical

is doubtful

appearance as the source of the

"uniqueness". The most common answer would probably be connected

to

the mind or the brain, or processes of either. Some would answer that
the experiences

of each individual are unique; or that the values of

each are unique; or that the desire, goals, thoughts, etc. are unique.
All we can do then is to describe the unique character to the best of
our

ability

and leave it at that. The examination of those unique

characteristics are best left to the biographers, poets and
(who are

lovers

in turmoil over every thought of their loved one). Yet the

authors are not content merely to point out the unique characterstics!
More often than not, they wish to make a general statement about

the
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important

or

differences

substantive

like hair

uniqueness

colour

or

(i.e., uniqueness

fingerprints

etc).

excluding
The

unique

cliaracteristic s contribute something or are instrumental in creating
something important or essential for that
every

individual.

individual, and even for

(Often, whatever characteristic is unique in one

individual is unique in every individual. For instance, everyone

has

fingerprints, yet each is unique to one individual.) I must conclude,
therefore, that what

is meant by uniqueness in individuals is that

there are characteristics or attributes which belong to man as a whole
but which

exhibit

themselves

attribute

of memory

is

remembers is different. A
importance

of

the

in

uniquely

individual.

then can be made

exhibition

of

an attribute

development, or existence of each individual and of man
When

the original

claim

of

themselves

without

about

the

for

the

as a whole.

the "unique individual" was made, some

importance was attached to certain characteristics
exhibit

The

every human yet what each individual

statement

unique

in every

being

hindrances, otherwise

allowed

little

or

to
no

importance would have been attached to "uniqueness". The attribute or
characteristic may involve

goals, self-achievement

or

fulfillment,

values, decisions, morals and responsibility and so on. Each involves
reason, judgement, will,

choice etc. i.e., functions of the mind in

and for itself. Consequently for the purposes of this paper, I
uniqueness

as

a

regulating being.

variety

of

the

concept

treat

"autonomy" i.e., a self-

16

Josiah Royce has an
follows

implicit

concept

of

the

individual

that

the reasoning that I have outlined above . He starts out as

follows:

So that to exist implies...to be different from the
rest of the world of existences. And since I must
exist if I am to have any qualities whereby I can
resemble another being, and must differ from all
other beings if I am to exist, it naturally seems
that my differences from all the rest of the world
is, in a sense, the deepest truth about me.... By
an individual...we mean an essentially unique
being, or a being such that there exists, and can
exist, but one of the type constituted by this
individual being. 12.
Later on, however, he makes the following claims:

...I hold the concept of individuality...in itself,
essentially
and altogether, a
teleological
concept...implying that the facts of any world
where there really are individuals express will and
purpose. 13.
And, more baldly:

An individual is a being that adequately
a purpose. 14.
At

first

expresses

it was the uniqueness of characteristics that he claims

make the individual. Later, in order to present a coherent theory, he
choses what he deems to be essential and arrives at a

teleologically

oriented or purposive being, i.e. a concept closely related to, if not
an attribute

of, autonomy. Autonomy is a concept that includes such
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items as self-regulation, self government, self -rule, etc., and
usually

includes

a

vague notion

of

independence.

An autonomous

region, for example, will make its own laws and enforce
aid

or

interference

from

outside

it

them without

governments, yet will still be

considered a part of a whole. Kant had a more precise

use of

the

concept when he applied it to humans and human thinking:
...subject
only
to his own, yet universal,
legislation, and ... he is only bound to act in
accordance with his own will, which is, however
designed by nature to be a will giving universal
laws. 15.
... man and, in general, every rational being
exists as an end in himself and not merely as a
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.
16.
The independence that results from the autonomy of human thinking, is
not

a

substantive concept in that the human mind has no choice to be

independent.

It simply is. For Kant, the human mind can only think

in certain ways or patterns which he labeled "categories", and it is
impossible to break through those patterns or categories.

This does

not mean that a human being cannot submit to another, it is just that
the choice to submit is the result of an independent action, and
act of

submission becomes the basis of the rules which the human has

adopted for himself. His autonomy is still
chosen

that

to adopt

submissive

rules

choose the rules

throughout

his

for

intact because he has

himself and he continues to

submission.

The

existentialists

18

picked

up on this point and formed a ne\tf movement around that central

core.

The inability of the human to break
patterns

of

through the categories or

the mind, indicates a definite limitation in the freedom

of thought, and the range of human reason. These limitations indicate
that the role of
drastically

'autonomy' must

in turn be restrained

curtailled. Man cannot be autonomous or self-regulating,

which involves an element of will or reason, if there are
limitations

if not

imposed prior

structural

to reason, and prior to will. With such

limitations, autonomy can occur when the structure of his o\m
allows

it.

It

mind

is common knowledge, today, that many people suffer

from cumpulsions whose source is the unconscious. The unconscious
outside

is

the control of reason or the awareness of the conscious, and,

as such, must be considered

a

further

limitation on the rule of

autonomy.

Autonomy, as a concept, is a view of man and his judgment that is
more acceptable to the protestant view in which each individual
morally

responsible

is a

unit. Each soul is responsible for its own sins

and its own salvation, i.e., responsible to have faith, to believe, to
choose to be "born again". Calvin's doctrine of the elect is a more
convoluted

version of the same thing. Arminianism is an extreme view

in which each soul must always choose because he is always responsible
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for sins and for his choice
requires

autonomy

to "be

saved".

The responsible

soul

in order for it to choose faith and salvation.

In

the Middle Ages, the scolastics required a fierce debate over "free or
autonomous will" in order to speak of God's relationship
the meaning

of

the

to man and

death of Jesus on the cross. By the sixteenth

century, the doctrine of "free will" had won universal acceptance. By
the time Deism had eliminated an all-knowing, all-caring God from
concept

the

of the individual, the basic characteristics of an autonomous

individual were well established.

The individual

had

reason, will,

judgment, etc., and for those reasons he was subject to no other man.
The basic principle of man must be found trithin man himself, and not
in another man, entity, or being.

Peter McCormick
whenever

there

Historically

is a

claims that

the concept of autonomy

breakdown of a highly

society.

and existentially, society comes before any individual

and assigns him an identity but with a collapse of
individual

integrated

occurs

that society the

is left on his own. The individual starts to perceive of

himself as an "autonomous, differentiated,

self-starting

However,

...the individual is not a raw datum, not a
conceptual starting point, not a simple "given" to
human experience, but a conceptual construction of
considerable complexity emerging from a specific
type of social experience, namely the experience of
social breakdown. 17.

individual.
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Should McCormick's claim (and that of Michael Oakeshott whom McCormick
acknowledges

as

the

source

of

the idea) have any validity, then

autonomy has the similar root causes as some varieties
anomie.

of

Durkheim's

The problem, not discussed by McCormick, is whether or not

such a collapse is in the natural order of things, i.e. , a natural
step in the evolving nature of man.

As

a consequence

of

defining

the human individual as unique,

distinct, autonomous, separate, etc., society has had to be defined in
such a manner as to accommodate
Society,

the meaning

of

the "individual".

then, becomes an aggregate of individuals, or of individuals

and relations. Its existence is attributable to the creative mind
every

of

individual, or in other words, society is a rational construct.

The focus of what is human centers on the individual
the means or

and

society

is

the instrument through which individuals live together

and achieve values, goals, normally

outside

the grasp of any one

individual.

To

sum up

the aspects

of "individual", we have arrived at a

postion where there are two streams of meanings. On the one hand, the
individual is distinct, separate, complete
i.e.,

subject

to spatio-temporal

another thing ,physically
structure.
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On

the

in itself, unrepeatable,

location.

finite, and as
other hand, it

It

such a

is itself and not
self-maintaining

is autonomous, unique,

self-regulating, whose roots are in the human mind.
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There are two objections

to both streams of

thought.

As

a

biological organization man is a living thing and any deep disturbance
in his "component

parts is likely to affect the health and even the

viability of the whole organism". 19. Should a death, divorce, loss
of

job, illness

to a loved

one, etc. occur

in the life of the

individual, the health of the individual is affected - enough of
incidents

such

and the individual can die. Somehow, the biological man is

linked to entities outside the individual. The

second

objection

is

that such definitions are static. The human is a "coordinated stream
of personal experiences" which is his "thread of
human

individual

is as much a

life".

20.

The

continuity as is society. How the

process of both continuities are involved cannot be answered

in the

static manner of an isolate individual.

We

usually

speak

of "individual"

in contradistinction

to

"society", yet whatever "society" may be, it is linked more closely to
"person" and "personality". The concept

itself

had

little meaning

until the end of the Middle Ages. The rise of the importance of reason
or judgement as an end for humanity
a

value beyond

gave each human an importance and

the considerations

of

society. The Revolution in

thought, reflected in Descartes' Meditations, conceptually divided the
human into parts resulting in such problems as the mind/body

dualism.
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Conceptually,

the ancient Jews (and perhaps the modern Semitics)

were unable to divide the human into various parts. Only with
advent

of

the ancient Greeks

and

dialectic

the

reasoning, could the

various aspects of the human be thought of as things. The

soul

could

exist, and, indeed, did exist without the body, according to Plato's
teaching

in the Phaedo. The concentration

knowledge

on the human, advocated

enabled the Greeks to divide the human
parts:

of man's

by Socrates

search for

and the Sophists,

into two basically

distinct

1) the body, i.e. the material, crass, entity of feelings and

emotions, and, 2) the soul, i.e. the reasoning, contemplating, judging
entity of logic, laws and knowledge. With the advent

of

Christianity

and a new emphasis on personal salvation, the soul became the entity
of primary importance, but it too was divided into two parts:
soul, i.e.,

the eternal

spirit encompassing the divine linking the

individual to the "universalis fidelis", and, 2) reason

The

1) the

or

judgment.

importance of these new conceptually distinct entities can be

seen by the effect they had on medieval thought. St. Thomas wrote:
the knowable object is proportioned to the
knowing power. Now, there are three levels of
knowing powers. One kind of knowing power is the
act of a corporeal organ, namely sensation.
Therefore, the object of any sensitive potency is
the form as it exists in corporeal matter. Since
this kind of matter
is
the principle
of
individualism, every power of the sensitive past of
the soul is able to know particular things only.
Another kind of knowing power is that which is
neither the act of a corporeal organ nor in any way
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associated with corporeal matter:
the angelic
intellect, for instance. So, the object of this
knowing power is a form subsisting apart from
matter; although they may know material things,
they see them in immaterial beings - either in
themselves, or in God. Now, the human intellect
occupies a middle position: it is not the act of
any organ, yet it is a power of the soul which is
the Form
of
of the body, as we explained
previously.21.
St. Thomas, however, applied the name "man" to both the body

and

the

soul together and not to either one alone. The Platonic idea of a soul
"trapped"

in a body was

unacceptable

predecessors. St. Thomas did believe
between

the

soul and

divided

into parts:

to him but not

there was

a real

to his

distinction

the faculties. The faculties themselves were
the vegetative

nutrition, growth, reproduction;

faculties,

the

sensitive

concerned

faculties, such as

sight, hearing, smell etc. and

imagination, memory, etc.; and

rational

claims

faculties. He

also

with

the

that man is free because he is

rational.22.

Although St. Thomas differentiated
tried

various

aspects

of man yet

to keep man as a unit, Descartes rent the aspects asunder. The

bodily faculties and the mental Faculties could not be trusted.
the thinking

" I " could

be known as certain. Descartes spoke of the

relationship of the " I " and the body
"pilot" at

Only

as comparable

to that

of

a

the wheel of a ship. After his Meditations, and with the

advent of secularism, the mind or reason

(soul) and

the body were
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considered to be two distinct entities, if not two distinct existents.
Gilbert Ryle labeled the concept as "The Official Doctrine".23. In it,
human bodies are

in space and subject to mechanical laws of spacial

objects, whereas minds are not in space or subject to mechanical laws.
The body and its actions can be observed

by others yet

the mind

cannot.

Without

labeling myself

as a Thomist or something else, and for

the purposes of this paper only, I wish to assume that the "mind" or
"person", is as

inextricably

a part of a human, as is the body.

(Strawson's Individuals gives an excellent, if imperfect, argument for
this position.) The "mind",
"body" etc. are merely

the "will",

aspects

the "consciousness", the

of what is human and the splits or

gulfs between them are without foundation in reality.

There is a sense of inadequacy in our concept of

the individual.

For hundreds of years, Western culture has sought to find the basic
ingredients in the concept and has failed. The
"unbeing",

the "Nothingness" of

led

to

the

the existentialists (particularly

Sartre) with its accompanying 'dread', 'nausea',
unto death', that any peasant would
deserves. The failure permeates

failure

all

'fear and

loathing

reject with the contempt it
of western

thought

so that

philosophical, humanist and cultural thought has stagnated. Using the
newest teciinological instruments, we probe and examine the lump

that
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is man

in the same manner as an archeologist probes and examines a

shard of pottery. What fits with our preprogrammed
accepted. What

assumptions

is

does not is thrown back into the dirt. We examine the

remains of man and assume that that is all there is to man.

Whitehead said once that scientists may

examine a dead cat -

measure and record all its organs, fibres, tendons, bones and flesh
but when they are done they still would not have a
creature that purred, meowed, rubbed

cat, a

live

its coat against your leg or

flicked its tail as it hunted. Using the scientific methods

only we

know so little of man. Concepts such as 'Reason,* 'Consciousness',
'Soul', 'Feeling', in fact, almost all the concepts that we

consider

human, lie outside the scope of science as we know it today. This is
particularily so of

the concept

of human

'life' and

the human

'individual'.

The concept

of the "individual" has many meanings and variations

of meanings but, when speaking of human beings, we usually have
things

two

in mind: 1) being a distinct entity and 2) acting according to

one's own will and for

one's own ends. The human

individual

is

regarded as a unit and as an agent at the same time. Other cultures
and other time periods had different views of man. Tribesmen often are
unable to distinguish themselves apart from the tribe.
Greeks were unable

to separate

The ancient

the "citizen" and the "state". The
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tendency

is to believe

that other

cultures are simply not as

"advanced" as ours. A belief in "progress" allows us to assume that
our culture is the most "civilized" and "advanced" the world has ever
seen, and, as such, our concepts are much nearer to the "actual truth
or nature" of man. A culturally "blind" man is also an ignorant man so
any concept under analysis must be bared of all possible

assumptions

(at least to the best of one's ability).

The Jewish people were unable to separate the various parts of the
individual,unlike

the Greeks or ourselves. When we speak of the soul,

the Semitic speaking person speaks of the inner aspects of the whole
man, because the whole man is a unit. We can separate the mind, the
soul, the body, the will, reason, etc. from the individual

and from

each other. The Old Testament Jews would find these concepts to be
completely beyond their ken. The difference between the contemplation
of the Greeks
that, for

and that of the Taoists and other oriental groups was

the orientals, contemplation was a means

themselves of

the material

of purging

in order to be at one with the One, the

Universal Being or Spirit; while for the Greeks, contemplation was a
means of understanding nature and oneself. It

is the difference

between mysticism and science. The oriental desired to merge with
whole, beyond himself, while

the

the Greeks thought of universals and

particulars and man. The one relied on

the non-rational and the

'Universal Being', the other relied on judgment and himself.
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It

is , of course, an exaggeration to polarize eastern and Greek

culture in such a manner yet the tendencies toward such polar
were

results

there. In the western world, Augustine and the early fathers of

the church were able to repress reason's or judgment's role in western
culture, but for St. Thomas and many other

eminent

thinkers

of

the

dying middle Ages and early Renaissance, judgement had become a key
concept. Augustinanism no longer dominated the western world.

Max Weber developed a theory around the Protestant work
explain

ethic

to

the remarkable technological and economic differences between

countries such as Italy and England or Spain and Holland. However, the
Protestant Reformation reflected a crisis in Western culture. It is no
accident that the Reformation occurred after the printing press was
invented for

learning was

particular, the final

the key

to its success. For Calvin, in

earthly authority

was

the

individual's

conscience, that is, his judgement concerning God's will. Each man had
to know what God wanted man to do, hence the need to read and study
the Bible, hence the need for education and printing.

Marsilius, William of Ockham and the Renaissance
remarkably

from John of Salisbury

and

writers

differ

other thinkers of his time

because of a new identity of the human being through his judgement and
his reason. More's Utopia and Bacon's Novum Organum
references

contain numerous

to false myths, false idols and so on. Only man's reason
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applied to

the world was

the final

rejected Aristotle and Plato

arbiter.

Bacon consciously

to found the basis for a new thought.

Both More and Bacon, but more particularly Bacon, witnessed the change
from the Aristotelian-Scholastic

logical

tradition

to a newer or

modern view in the British Universities, which depended on, as the
ultimate authority, 'clear and distinct' ideas.

Descartes summarized the new attitude

in a bare yet

explicit

proposition "cogito ergo sum". By his method, which is basically the
method adopted by western culture, the only and ultimate authority for
everything (and by this I do not mean the ultimate cause or creator or
whatever) is reason: I'm reasoning, therefore I am. I know I exist
because thinking

is the one thing I can be sure that is absolutely

beyond doubt. However, in order to follow Descartes' method, I had

to

place aside everything that I cannot be sure of: the senses, the body,
the thoughts of my mind.

I rightly conclude that my essence consists solely
in the fact that I am a thinking thing... And
although possibly... I possess a body with which I
am very intimately conjoined, yet because, on the
one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of
myself in as much as I am only a thinking and
unextended thing, and as, on the other, I possess a
distinct idea of body, in as much as it is only an
extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that
this I that is to say, my soul by which I am what
I am , is entirely and absolutely distinct from my
body, and can exist without it.24.
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Westen

thought

had

reached

the point where

the

'individual' is

divided. The Semitic people would find this concept completely

beyond

them.

Science at

the present moment is able to make head transplants

from one body to another. Soon, no doubt, scientists will be
place

able

to

the head of one person on the body of another. Should the body

of the donor die, do we consider the person 'A' dead although his head
will still be alive on another body? How would we solve the matter of
identity? Descartes

believed

that

the

identity of

a person

was

contained in the " I " that inhabited the body, and that the " I " did not
need

the body to exist. We, in our present culture, may believe that

the "I" needs the body to exist, yet our science fiction
with examples

of mind

is

repleat

transplants, souls or minds inhabiting other

bodies etc. I am certain that should the life of the body be

opposed

to the thoughts and actions of the mind, most people would choose the
latter. However, should a person try to kill his body to release

his

soul, we would judge him insane and send him to psychiatric treatment.
A

child, so severely retarded that it is more a lump of flesh than a

human, cannot be mistreated or destroyed because of

the "rights" it

has, or the humanity it has, and so on.

Nobody doubts that every individual human being has a value simply
because he

exists

as a human being. Variations of this theme have
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existed throughout recorded history. However, the source or
upon which

the value

principle

is founded differ profoundly. In Genesis, God

created man in his own image and for that reason man was valuable. He
did not belong

to himself - he belonged to God. For Aristotle, the

individual was of value as a citizen, that

is, he belonged

to the

state. While for Plato, in the Republic, the individual fulfills only
part of the function of the state, he can do his part in the harmony
of the

state only when he himself has the self-control or temperance

to be in harmony with himself.25. For the early Christians, he was

of

value because Jesus had died for man and every soul was sacred. In the
Middle Ages, the individual belonged to the 'body of the Faithful", to
the church which was now 'the body of Christ'. The believer was part
of a unit.

Luther changed the concept, or at least, represents

a change

in

the concept so that the individual no longer is a part of a unit. The
concept

of

the

individual

stood out above the crowd and started to

dominate the western cultural thought. Individual will
were

suddenly

very

and

judgment

important. The individual was important for two

reasons: 1) Jesus had died on the cross for every sinner, and 2) every
person could choose to believe and accept or not. In the Middle Ages,
it was not the person who was important but the office he held. By the
time of

the Reformation, however, the individual was as important as

the office he held, if not more so.
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The concept of the "individual" seems to have evolved as a moral
concept centered on the principle of "redemption" - a key principle in
Christianity.

"Redemption" required

something to be redeemed - the

soul, something to be redeemed "from" - sin, and a means of redemption
- Christ's blood and an

individual moral

responsibility. No

other

major religion (that I know of) has such a program. As a result, there
was no need

to develop

accompanying moral

the concept

accoutrements.

of the "individual" with its

Taoism

emphasized

individual

contemplation and a good life, but this was required in order to "see"
behind

the "presented" world and merge with the "Universal Principle"

or "Universal Being".

In the first part

of

the paper, the development

of

the

"individual" as a moral concept, first with theological implications,
then social implications, and

finally with political

implications,

will be examined. The development of the "individual" benefitted from
conceptual developments other than moral but these additions were used
to augment the dominant moral theme. These additional concepts were a
new view of nature and of the state by the Greeks, a different concept
of law and of personal allegiance in the Medieval Age, and a new means
of communication and a new view of science in the Renaissance. Part I
of the paper, then, is a history of the development of the concept of
the individual.
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There is a problem of "identity". When we
culturally

"preprogrammed "

view "man", are we

to see an "individual" with all the

emotional overtones that that concept evokes? Is the "individual" of
value because he has an individual soul (as Luther claimed)? because
he is a morally responsible being (as St. Thomas and Luther claimed)?
or because he is an autonomous

reasoning

being

(as Kant

claimed)?

Others, however, believe that the "individual", as depicted above, is
a fallacy and that his value is only as a part of
Part

II examines

a greater

the "individual" to discover his "true material"

nature and whether or not he is an "individual" to begin with.
III

entity.

Part

continues that examination, but focuses on the "higher faculties"

such as consciousness, reason, conscience, and so on.

In our examination of the concept of the "individual", I shall try
to avoid an error pointed out by Nietzsche:

All philosophers share this common error: they
proceed from contemporary man and think they can
reach their goal through analysis of this man.
Automatically they think of "man" as an eternal
verity, as something abiding in the whirlpool, as a
sure measure of things. Everything
that
the
philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom
no more than a testimony about the man of a very
limited period. Lack of a historical sense is the
original error of all philosophers....26.
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PART ONE
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Individualism exists in many areas of study: political, religious,
economic, scientific, etc.
political

aspects

of

For the purposes of this paper, only

the

concept

will be examined.

the

This is not a

claim that the political "individual" can be separated in reality, for
man has many roles; it is only a limitation
examination

or

brought into our
political
unit.

or

a boundary

for

our

our focus of attention. The religious aspect will be
focus

aspect.

As

only

insofar

a political

as

that

aspect

affects

the

concept, individualism is not a

There are a number of strands of thought

running

through

the

concept with numerous qualities or attributes with a theoretical range
from German Romanticism to anarchistic individualism.
a

basic

root which

we will

examine

strands themselves. The hope is that

we

Each strand has

and then we will examine the
can

see

how

the

concept

attained its basic structure today by examining its past roots as well
as the more recent history in Europe and North America.

Traditional Man.

It

is unfortunate

that

the

ancient

world is passed by in the

realms of political theory and political history, for there
in

the

occurred,

ancient worlds, four significant changes, indeed revolutions,

in thought that were to have great significance on the political
of

the western world.

life

That the political and social thought of the
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western world is different from that of China or India rests on

these

four pillars. The Jewish people are usually credited for the gifts of
"one

god"

and

a religious tradition. The concept of "one god" is an

important gift, yet two other concepts: an "individualized" God; and
a

separation

of divine and civic law, - were also inherited from the

Jews, and these latter two concepts are most
and

social

thought.

Another

important

in political

nation, the Greeks, reinforced the

concept of the separation of divine and civic laws, and added a

third

change, a bifurcation of the state, as a concept, and religion, as a
concept.

The fourth change involved man as a subject

of

study.

In

Greece, Socrates epitomizes a change in Greek thinking. Unlike Homer,
Thales, and other older thinkers, Socrates did not study the gods, nor
the world alone, he asked questions of man. As a result new ideas of
"justice", "good", "community", etc., emerged
man's

intellectual

questing.

on

the

forefront

of

Jesus, with his emphasis on grace and

personal salvation, reinforced the prominance of the fourth change

in

western civilization.

Hubert

Butterfield

recognized the importance of the individual's

conscience throughout western civilization:

... the weapon that Christianity always holds in
reserve, namely
the
willingness
to
accept
martyrdom. In the last resort the Christian has
had one thing to say to society in every age of
history and sometimes he has had to say it to
other Christians when they were untrue to their
principles and were trying to force his conscience.
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He has said: "I will worship God, even if you kill
me... 1
The modern

"relation"

to

that

"weapon" must

be

the non-violent

campaigns of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. King wrote:
I submit that an individual who breaks a law that
conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts
the penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience
of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the very highest respect for law.
Of
course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil
dis- obedience.
It xvas seen sublimely in the refusal
of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of
Nebuchadnezzar because a higher moral lax* was involved.
2.
In both quotes, there are two principles involved: the conscience
of the individual, and the separation of divine and
one

civil

laws.

At

time, morality, ethics, conscience, and the worship of God, were

external to the personality of the

individual.

The

tribe was

the

whole for the individual. The individual's consciousness was confined
to,

and

submerged in, the tribal consciousness.

Every member of the

tribe considered himself as the descendent of, the child
family

of, etc., the tribal god or gods.

tribe, not the individual.
tribe, he

lost

his

me

not

to

in the

The god was the god of the

When a member was expelled or

left

the

god, and the tribe would say: "Go, serve other

gods." 3. Ruth performed a similar ritual when
"Interest

of,

leave

she

said

to Naomi:

thee, or to return from following after

thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and

where

thou

lodgest, I
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will

lodge:

thy

people

shall be my people, and thy God my God" 4.

(emphasis added).

In the early civilizations of Mesopotamia, the individual
intrinsic

value

as

an

end

had

in himself. A "characteristic of these

civilizations was a tendency to identify religious values with
immanent

to

the

social

no

order."

5.

those

The state was governed by "the

assembly of the gods"; "the gods own the land, the big

estates"; and

man was created by the gods so "his purpose is to serve the gods". (6)
The whole aim of the state was to benefit the gods, not the members of
the

state.

powerful.
national
five

In

Egypt, the

religious

institutions

were almost as

In the third kingdom, a god-king ruled the state and

other

gods supported his rule. The temples owned one out of every

inhabitants, and

Opportunistic

one-third

of

individuals, noble

pharaohs, until the strain broke

the

and

Egypt

cultivatable

land.

(7)

poor, defied the rule of the
into ivarring

factions.

(8)

However, the new petty princes and land barons took to extremes the
personal rule of the old pharaohs, and anarchy prevailed.
concept

separate

from

the

concept

of

divine

Law, as a

proclamation

principles, was lacking, and never managed to be a part
culture.

As

a

Egyptian

result, law (and therefore order and stability) was

always "part and parcel" of the divine order - i.e. the
the

of

or

god-king

and

temples. Egyptian political culture could not be conceived apart

from the pharaohs as god-kings.

It can

be no

accident

that

Egypt
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remained

relatively quiet under Roman rule after Cleopatra lost her

kingdom to Augustus. Caesar had been made a god in Egypt and, after
his death, throughout Rome; Augustus was his nephew and heir and he
too was created a god after his death. Soon every emperor was made a
god.

The line of divinity was continued in Egypt and so was the law.

The Jewish nation was founded on the belief that God chose them as
His people (belonging to Him) and a covenant (9) was
God

set up between

and His people, i.e. the nation as a whole. "And I will make my

covenant between me and thee, and will multiply

thee exceedingly."

The Jewish nation was called "the seed of Abraham".
"God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" for
leaders of the Jewish people.

The

these were
law

the fathers

(Torah) was

proclamations that applied to the nation as a whole.
were
other

The God was the

The

i.e.

the divine
executions

done by stoning, in which all take part. (10) When a murder or
crime was perpetrated,

responsible.

the community or

tribe was

also

For an unsolved murder, the elders of the community had

to go through a purification ritual. (11) When

the concubine of a

Levite was raped and killed by a few men in Gibeah, a city belonging
to the Benjamites, the Levite cut up the woman in twelve pieces and
sent one piece to each of the tribes of Israel. The other tribes felt
obligated

to form an 'assembly of the people of God'. They asked the

Benjamites to give up

the men who had done

the deed, but

the

Benjamites would not give up members of their tribe. As a result, the
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other

tribes fought

the

Benjamites, defeated them and burned their

cities. The destruction was so great that it was feared the Benjamite
tribe was finished. The other tribes had sworn not to give wives
any Benjamite yet

they asked

God

to

intervene

Benjamites. "And the children of Israel repented
their brother, and

on behalf of the

them

for

Benjamin

said there is one tribe cut off from Israel this

day." (12) The solution is strange to us but not to the Jews.
city had not

sent

any men

to

and

given

to

One

the assembly, and, because of this

negligence, they were destroyed but their women
captured

to

the Benjamites.

(i.e. virgins) were

(13) Each decision by the

Israelites was sanctioned or commanded by Phineas the High Priest

and

keeper of the Ark.

The

Levite had a claim on the whole people for justice under the

Torah. The whole tribe of Benjamin was punished for breaking the laws
about murder. The whole tribe was punished (and almost destroyed) for
the sins of a few.
essential

However, the tribe of Benjamin was

as a part

of

considered

the whole, a "brother" in the 'family' of

Israel. Later on, Solomon sinned, so the Jewish nation was punished.
Earlier, Moses had three thousand men killed because they worshiped a
golden calf. (14) All the law and

the customs of

designed, not

Israel, but

for

the people

of

the Jews was

for the continuing

relationship between the people and their God. The foundation of
law was

the

the covenant and the will of God. (15) Anyone breaking the
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laws of the covenant brought punishment on the whole of Israel. It is
for this reason that the scapegoat was slain.
the

tribe as a whole

The

goat

represented

and Aaron had to confess over him "all the

iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions
all their sins".

in

(16)

In the early history of Israel, therefore, the individual counted
for little. He was a part of a nation 'family' belonging to a jealous
God. To rebel in the family, was to deny the will
punishment was

death.

of God

and

the

In fact, for a child to rebel against his own

parents was also seen in a similar light. The rebellious son is taken
to the elders of the city and "all the men of his city shall stone him
with stones, that he die." (17)
dispersal

of

However, the destruction

and

the

the Jewish nation brought about a change unique in its

influence.

In Jeremiah and Ezekiel, a new concept was emerging. God was no
longer just the God of the nation as a whole, for the nation no longer
existed

as a unit, He became

a God for the individual. From the

externally oriented religion, Judaism now was oriented
man.

God was

individualized.

to

the

inner

Daniel prayed to and fought for God

alone. Aaron could not think of defying the people

of

Israel when

they asked him to build a golden calf. Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego
defied Nebuchadnezzar

because

of their faith.

In Jeremiah, God had
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proclaimed a new covenant would be made when He brought the Jews back
to Israel:
After these days, saith the Lord, I will put my law
in their irovard parts, and write it in their
hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my
people. And they shall teach no more every man his
neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know
the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the
least of them unto the greatest of them
(18)
From now on, "everyone shall

die

for

his

own

iniquity".

After the people returned, the new covenant was instituted.
are

God's

and

(19)

All souls

every man is responsible for his own soul. (20) From

now on, there was a direct link of each individual to his God, and

of

each person's responsibility for his soul to his own conscience.

As

a result of this new 'covenant', two sets of laws were set for

each follower of God: the higher, moral law of
civil

law

God,

and

the

lesser

of man. Daniel and his friends obeyed the higher laws of

God rather than the laws of their earthly rulers. Whereas before

the

exile, prophets had always linked the law, even a written law, (21) to
God

as being expressions of His will, after the exile, Ezra uses the

law to bring the people together and to take them out of 'bondage' and
the people gave up their foreign wives and children, and

their

lands

in order to obey the law and go to Israel once again. (22) "From being
a nation tied to the law Israel becomes a religious community gathered
around

the

law."

(23)

The

loss of the ark and the temple did not

44

destroy the Jewish religion because of the new emphasis on the law for
its own sake. God's direct contact with the nation of Israel declines
after this point. This change is reflected in the use of the word for
'law'.
the

Earlier prophets used 'torah' not only for law but

divine

word.

authority, no
involved

It was

matter

the

a

duty

of

the priests.

circumstances.

Later

also

for

It had divine

on, others were

in the law, such as scribes, yet the divine authority within

the laws was still evident. (24) After the exile, the law becomes

a

more concrete concept. The law becomes more important than the temple
and

the

scribes more important than the priests. (25) In fact, the

Pharisees had come to believe that the law and the

strict

observance

of the law was the only salvation for the believer. However, the same
word

is

also

military laws.
•vouos'

used

to

describe the laws of other lands and even of

It is Greek they used in Hellenic times and

is not

a

the word

strict translation of 'torah'. New elements have

been included in the concept. (26)

The exile of the Jews in Babylon
in

thought: God

became

resulted in two radical

individualized,

and

the law became a more

substantive concept while being divided into the higher moral
God

and the lesser civil law of man.

Jewish nation.

changes

law of

These changes are unique to the
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In China, one of the words for the
means

'state' is

'kuo-chia' which

'state-family', and, as in a family, all the members, including

the ruler, must work together. Within the state, the clans were of
great

importance.

The clan was responsible for the behaviour of all

its members, and whole families were fined or killed as punishment for
the crime of one of its members.
Chinese

society

(28)

In many ways, the

of 500 B.C. was similar to the Jewish society at the

same time. The individual thought of himself
family and not as an isolated entity.
up his own household
married
household

ancient

according

to

could be

as a member

of

the

It was a crime for a son to set

while his parents were living. Children were
their parents' wishes.

No member

of

the

forced to testify against another member and any

child that accused his parents should be put
accusation was proven

to death

even

if the

to be true. Religious communities were also

treated as families, so that a master and novice were treated as uncle
and nephew. Each family was like a little kingdom. (29)

The religious movements usually emphasized
Taoists were almost

the

individual.

The

anarchical in their value on human freedom.

No

government had any rights over the individual for the Taoist, but then
they did not set a high value

on

society

and

often chose

recluses. (30) Confucius, on the other hand, said:
It is not in the nature of man to find his social life
among the beasts and birds. If we do not remain in the
society of men, with whom else can ire associate

to be
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ourselves? Moreover, if the world were in good order,
I should not be trying to change it. (31)
Like Plato, he sought a prince who would put his

ideas

into

practice but failed. The Buddhists reinforced the Taoists principles
when they arrived
veneration

to

in China.

They

declared

that

"monks

owe no

the king." (32) For all three religions, there was a

sort of higher moral law to which the individual was responsible.

However, there were exceptions. The legalists
the

individual

or

to

law greater

than

that

end.

There was no

of the state. They denied family

relationships because the individual belonged, and owed his
to the state.

ignore

because the state was all important. The end was the

state and the people were merely means to that
power

tended

loyalty,

Lord Shang, one of the major founders of China as we

know it today, was one of the major proponents. The Ch'in state, with
such an ideology, was able to expand into an empire, the first
China

(255-207

B.C.)

(33) Later

in

Confucianism was a wedding of the

thought of Confucius and the thought of the Legalists.

The old legal system was set up in the Han period

(206-23

B.C.)

and settled in the T'ant Dynasty (618-905 A.D.) and remained basically
the

same until the end of the nineteenth century.

There was no civil

law, as all law was penal and linked to ethical or moral law.
of the link, the law was always sovereign and not

Because

the emperor.

All
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had

to

obey

the

law.

(reigned 179-156 B.C.).
the

This

principle

was set by the Emperor Wen

(34) The family was

rigidly

reinforced

by

law (as noted above) and the individual was denied any conceptual

existence.

The Chinese philosophy

was

one

which

viewed

the

well-integrated individual as one who thought of his duties and not of
his rights.

The Japanese

had

a

similar cultural experience. The 'samurai'

class were treated like a family and were called the 'children of
family', yet

had

a kind of lord/vassal contractual value. (35) The

family "stood above
individual

the

the

individual

as

the

ethical

reality.

The

was the secondary existence within the structure of the ie

(family) to which
principles with

he
the

belonged."
addition

(36)

of

a

India

caste

reflects

system.

the

same

(37) It, too,

reflects a union of law with the divine. "The rajan, or prince, was
an

instrument

(dharma).

of

society,

an

upholder and protector of social law

But he had no authority either to make or

to modify

law,

for 'dharma' was divine, ancient, revealed in words heard from God..."
(38)

In

the oriental world, the law remained joined to the divine, and

the religion remained an external concept, i.e.
not

directed

inwardly

to

the

soul.

'outer-directed'

and

Form, duties, rituals, etc.

remained more important than individual conscience. The

attempts

by
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early Taoism, Confucius, and early Buddhists to link the individual to
the

divine

directly

failed and one of the reasons is that the 'law'

was not a distinct concept and was not conceptually separated into the
divine and civil laws.

In a monotheistic society like Judaism, it is hard to separate the
church and the state as conceptual entities.
well,

the

In China and

India, as

society was a means of enforcing the divine on earth. The

early Jewish state was the same. The Egyptians found it impossible to
conceptualize Egypt without the divine. Ancient Greece, however, was
able

to bifurcate

the

concepts. At first, the Greeks, like Homer,

believed that the gods were involved in everything.

By Plato's time,

the two concepts were quite distinct.

Thales,

one

of

the

earliest philosophers, was able to say "all

things are full of gods" (39) Hesiod looked at the city, he saw that
those who

"do not step at all off the road of Tightness, their city

flourishes" but "when men like harsh violence and cruel acts, Zeus ...
ordains their punishment. Often a whole city is paid

punishment

for

one bad man who commits crimes and plans reckless action." (40) For
Hesiod, "Justice herself is a young maiden. She is

Zeus's daughter"

and "immortals are close to us, they mingle with men". (41) The state
and

the

divine

were

conceptually

indistinguishable.

thought of "Justice" in the same manner as Hesiod. (42)

Even

Solon
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Lycurgus, however, must have had a clearer conception of the state
in mind when

he

set

up

the

Spartan

constitution.

According

to

Xenophon, the two kings were considered to be of divine descent and as
such performed
armies.
The

religious

duties

on behalf of the state and led the

Items offered in sacrifice were often

given

to

the kings.

kings were also the ones who consulted the gods on behalf of the

state.

The state, however, was run by a council called

ephors were

chosen

from

all

classes

of

the

ephors.

citizenry

dictatorial powers. Only the ephors did not have to rise
seats

whenever

a king was present.

on

but

from

had

their

Every month, the ephors and the

kings exchanged oaths, the ephors on behalf
kings

The

of

the

state, and

the

their own behalf. The kings' oath was: "I will exercise my

kingship in accordance with the established laws of the

state" while

the ephors swore: "so long as he (who exercises kingship) shall abide
by his oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken." (43)

In

Sparta, the concept of the state was distinct from the concept

of the divine. By the beginning of the Hellenic period in Athens, the
same distinction was part of Isocrates' view of his state. "The
of

a

state

soul

is nothing else than its polity". (44) Even in Plato's

time, the distinction was beginning to become clear. At the beginning
of Plato's Republic, Socrates waited until Cephelus
his

religious

duties

as

left

to perform

archon in order to examine the concepts of

'justice' and 'good' and the 'state'. Socrates, Plato

and Aristotle
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believed

that man

was

not

communities or in a polis.
temporary

identity

from

self-sufficient so people associated in

(45)

Pindar

believed

that man

has

a

god, but Plato details in the Laws how the

individual derives his identity from society.
children were given name

endings

that

In Plato's Greece, many

reflect

public

virtues

or

values, such as: 'agoras', 'the public speaker'; 'dikos' or 'dikaios',
'justified, just, etc'; 'demos', 'having to do with people'. (46) The
most important person was the one who could influence and lead others.

That

the

concept

of

the

state was perceived by the people of

Hellenic Athens to be distinct from the divine
looking

can

be

concluded

by

at the literature of the time. However, the reasons for such

a change are not grasped as easily.
concept

of nature

Leo Strauss believed that

a new

had been 'discovered', and this 'discovery' was a

necessary condition for the 'discovery' of natural rights.

In Hebrew,

there was no term for nature used in the Old Testament, so the concept
of natural

rights was missing

rights, Strauss

believed,

completely.

the

(47)

Without

natural

importance of the individual will be

negligible. However, without 'nature' as another basis or explanatory
foundation for
available.

the

Thales

state, the
had

divine was

believed

that

the

his

'foundation'

the gods were in everything.

Aristotle believed that it ivas in man's 'nature'
based

only

to be

social.

He

idea or justification for the 'polis' on the nature of man

himself and not on a divine ordinance.

Zeno, the founder of the Stoa,
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wrote a book called On The Nature Of Man in which he stated
end

of life was

that

the

to be in agreement with nature. (48) (The Stoics

developed the concept of nature to such an extent that they introduced
the concept of the 'original state of nature' which Hobbes
used

later

and

Locke

on.) The end of life was 'to act with good reason in the
\ms

selection of what is natural'. (49) The concept of man's nature
developed

by Zeno

to

such an extent

that, in his Republic, he

described a Utopian state where there was no government, no
rules,

but

those of nature.

Zeno's

law, no

'Republic' was an

early

anarchistic state.

The Pythagoreans were also involved in an area of study other than
the divine. However, their philosophical studies raised numbers
a

religion.

The

Sophists

of Socrates' time helped lay down the

foundations for the concept of nature. Protagoras said
the measure
'rational

of all

theory

philosophy.

to be

is

the first principle

of

the centre of the universe. For the

individual, (50) but

concept.

that man

The Sophists were convinced that a

of human nature' was

Sophists, man was an
non-universal

things.

Man was

into

it was

still

a

vague

The Sophists influenced many schools but the

dominant intellectual force of Greek thought that survived in western
civilization, was

that

of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

Despite

their divergence in views, these three men sought absolute values
which man,

individually

or

as

in

a society, could find true meaning.
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Eric Voegelin expressed this view saying that the new idea was one of
"a man who has found his true nature through finding his true relation
to God". (51)

Nature, and

human

nature, had suddenly become legitimate, and,

perhaps, the only legitimate, subject for study. The Babylonians had
studied

the

stars and the Egyptians laid the foundations of math and

engineering, but these were part of the divine.

The

Greeks

studied

the 'non-divine' for its own sake. It was during the study of man and
his nature that there arose questions of how man could apprehend ideas
such

as

'justice',

'good',

'happiness',

'courage', etc.

Aristotle and Zeno were led back to politics
polis.

For

and

the

study

of

the

Plato, the soul of the individual was tied to his social

nature and they were inseparable. He devoted most of Book
Laws

Plato,

to the question of the soul.

X

of

the

For Aristotle "the city-state is a

perfectly natural form of association, as

the

earlier

associations

from which it sprang were natural." (52)

A revolutionary change had occurred.
perceived

to be

separate

from

the

The state, as a concept, iras

concept

of the divine. A new

foundation, nature, had been discovered to replace the old.
were

unable

to

think

of themselves apart from God.

Egypt was inconceivable apart from the divine.
was

a

descendent

of the gods.

The Jews

The 'state' in

In Japan, the

emperor

In Chinese, the name for the emperor
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ivas ' Son-of-Heaven'. Nature, for the Taoists and others, ivas to

be

studied because it was part of the 'divine', inescapably joined to the
'divine'.

For

the Greeks, nature had its own foundations. Even the

gods were subject to their own natures. According

to the

surviving

Greek intellectual traditions, the state was founded on the 'nature of
man', and not on the pleasure of the gods.

The fourth and last change of the ancient world that we will be
discussing was a meld of the two major traditions in Christendom:
Jewish and

the

the Greek. Although Rome ruled at this time, it was the

thought of Hellenic Palestine that dominates the New Testament and the
thought of Christ. From the Hellenic, we have the individual and

the

state based on nature and justice on the stoic contract and agreement.
The Jewish

tradition presented the 'new covenant* and the importance

of the law. As a result, Christ was able
"Render, therefore, unto Caesar

to say to a questioner:

the things which are Caesar's; and

unto God the things which are God's." (53)

Christ's message, at that time, was directed
Sayings

such as "For

what

for his

soul?"

the individual.

is a man profited, if he shall gain the

whole world, and lose his own soul? or what
exchange

at

(54) and

"He

shall

a man

give

that believeth on me hath

everlasting life" (55) are common in the books of the Apostles.
Concordance will

show

that

"faith"

is a

in

Any

common xrord in the New
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Testament but almost missing in the Old. However, once the believer
joins the Followers of Christ, he becomes part of a family or a whole.
Paul

uses words

kindly

such as "philo-storgos" (56) in Romans 12:10:

affectioned

translation
Greek.

one to another

with brotherly

'kindly affectioned' misses

love".

"Be
The

the tone of the original

'Storge' meant 'love' as in 'family affection'. The Christian

community was considered to be a family and not a society.
could become the 'sons of God'
joint-heirs with Christ'

(John

'heirs of God, and

(Romans 8:17), "so we, being many, are one

body in Christ" (Romans 12:5).

In the Middle Ages, such concepts were

picked up by most of the intellects
individual

1:12),

Christians

of

the age.

The message

was

in nature, yet once it had been acted upon, the individual

lost his individuality and became part of something else

larger

than

himself, something more than a community or a society.

Other

areas

of

the Roman world were also beginning to recognize

the individual as a distinct concept. Following the Stoic
thought, Cicero

of

and Seneca often used the word 'individuum', meaning

'that which cannot be cut or divided', and later,
(57)

trend

'a unique

thing'.

Yet, both were passionately involved in the state. Cicero, in

particular, devoted his whole life to politics and to a concept of the
state, the values of which were the old Republican values of
devotion

selfless

to the state. Cicero tried to base his justification of the

state on reason and nature, individual values:
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Therefore, since there is nothing better than
reason, and since it exists both in man and in god,
the first community of man and god is a society of
reason. But those who have reason in common must
also have right reason in common, and since right
reason is law, we must believe that men are
associated also with the gods in law
Hence we
must now conceive this whole universe as one
commonwealth of gods and men. (58)
Another Stoic, Marcus
central

The

power

Aurelius, believed

that

"judgement

in man, the common source of truth and morality." (59)

individual

was

not

'distinct' concept, and

yet

an

'autonomous',

'unique',

arrived.

the human

Where the ancient Greeks had no equivalent to

our concept 'person', but
'community being',

or

the state was still more, or as, important,

yet the concept of the individual, as an important part of
makeup, had

is the

an

extensive

vocabulary

for

expressing

the later classical period was able to place more

emphasis on the individual apart from the state.

The ancient world presented us with many principles which we still
hold as fundamental to our set of beliefs. As far as the
the

individual

concept

of

is concerned, four of those principles are unique to

western culture. As we have seen, the Jewish

nation

was

able

to

'individualize God' so that the individual was responsible for his own
soul

and

conscience.

The

second

change was the separation of the

concept of law 'based on the divine' and law 'based on man'

or

civil
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law.

Law, for the Jews, had become a concept independent of God, yet

based on his moral law.
Greek

concept

of

This concept of law was

reinforced

to

Greeks

'nature'.

Taken

to

an

extreme, the

Stoics were

intellectual

trend

found

able

conceptualize man without a government in the 'state of nature'.
general

were

add an additional change - the separation of the concepts of

the 'state' and the divine'. A new foundation of the state was
in

the

law which had also originally connected law to the

divine but later was in contrast to the divine. (60) The
able

by

to
The

of the classical period, however, was to

maintain the importance of the state but with an added emphasis on the
individual.

These changes in thought were to have profound

on the Middle Ages, and on the modern world.

influence
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The Middle Ages.

The

Middle

Ages

'civilization', i.e.

(61)

were

noted

for

the breakdown

of

the intellectual tradition, for the dominance of

the Catholic Church and the revival of the organic traditions, and the
revival of tribal and the introduction of feudal traditions.
intellectual

realm,

In

the

the writings of St. Augustine, Cicero and Seneca

dominated entirely for almost eight hundred years. Only the Bible was
more sacrosanct in the minds of the academia.

Inheriting, as it did, the parallel concepts
state

from

the

classical

of

the

church and

age, the Middle Ages are a history of the

struggle between the two for temporal sovereignty.
with the church in the beginning, but

in

the

The upper hand was

end

the

church was

defeated, and it became a national institution. At the same time, the
state

developed

a new

justification

foundation was its own citizenry.
into

a

for

its

existence, and that

The development of

individual

citizen was a slowly developed and vague legacy of the Middle

Ages. As a "foundation", nature has been shifted from
the

the

the

state

to

individual. The Middle Ages (and the Renaissance which I include

in the general term "Middle Ages") arrived at a
ivhich reason,

judgement

and

nature

level

in

the soul were the part of man's nature

which induced him to live communally.
man's

conceptual

The state was

the

result

of

and was not necessarily "natural" itself in that it had
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its own nature. A fourth legacy of the Middle Ages was our perception
of time. St. Augustine's authority eliminated the cyclical conception
of time. Time was now linear and it had a purpose.

It was

linear

because a cyclical time concept would involve taking a happy soul with
God and returning him to the earth to be saved all over again.

It had

a purpose, ivhich was to reach the City of God. (62)

More

than anyone else, St. Augustine represented the union of the

Greco- Roman and the Judeo-Christian traditions of
studied

with

the

He had

Plotinus and his mystical Neo-Platonism, and he applied

the principles of Plato to the teachings
became

thought.

transcendent

qualities

of

Christ.

of God.

Plato's

ideas

The separation of the

divine and civil laws became "The City of God" and the "City of Man".
The

two were no longer reconcileable and man must endure the City of

Man in order to reach the City of God. However, the only way to find
the way to the City of God was through the revelation by God, and only
the knowledge of God was important. "God and the soul, that is what I
desire

to know.

Nothing

else?

Absolutely

nothing."

(63)

The

separation of the "City of God" and the "City of Man" was a principle
in

many

areas

of

the

classical

christian

church.

Constantine's adviser, admonished the Emperor Constantius
Arian-Athanasius struggle:

Hosius,

during

the
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Remember that you are but mortal; and be fearful of
the day of judgement and keep yourself pure with
that day in view. Do not interfere in matters
ecclesiastical
but learn about them from us.
For into your hands God has put the Kingdom; the
affairs of his Church he has committed to us. If
any man stole the Empire from you,he would be
resisting the ordinances of God... We are not
permitted to exercise an earthly rule; and you,
Sire, are not authorized to burn incense. (64)
Hosius

was

insistent

on

the

separation of church and state in

practical terms before St. Augustine was born. Taking
St.

Paul

his

cue from

(65), Hosius believed that either God allowed, or gave, the

kingdom to be ruled by its ruler. To disobey the ruler was to disobey
God. However, the ruler himself was not allowed to break God's
This was

laws.

to be a major contentious issue at the height of the Middle

Ages.

One of the great battles that the Middle Ages

then,

is

is noted

for,

the battle between the state and the church, a battle which

ended in the defeat of the church.

The height of the battle occurred between Gregory VII
IV. Gregory claimed complete sovereignty for the church:
Especially to me, as thy representative, has been
committed, and to me by thy grace has been given by
God the power of binding and loosing in heaven on
earth.
Relying,
then, on this belief... I
withdraw the government of the whole kingdom of the
Germans and of Italy from Henry the King... For he
has risen up against thy Church with unheard of
arrogance. (66)
Later on he added:

and Henry
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Shall not an authority founded by laymen - even by
those who do not know God, - be subject to that
authority which the providence of God Almighty has
for His own honour established and in his mercy
given to the world?... Who can doubt but that the
priests of Christ are to be considered the fathers
and masters of kings and princes and of all the
faithful? Is it not clearly pitiful madness for a
son to attempt to subject to himself his Father, a
pupil his master
(67)
Gregory used the concept of the family as well as moral arguments
to back his claim. Christendom was considered

by many

to be

the

'Family of God' and the church as the 'body of Christ'. In opposition
to Gregory's claims, Henry tried to link his rule directly to God. He
wrote to Gregory:
Henry, king not through usurption but through the
holy ordination of God.... thou, however, hast
understood our humility to be free, and hast not,
accordingly, shunned to rise up against the royal
power conferred upon us by God, daring to threaten
to divest us of it. As if we had received our
kingdom from thee! As if the kingdom and the
empire were in thine and not in God's hands! (68)
There is a sense that the king is a steward or a guardian whom God has
placed in charge directly. However, in neither case do the combatants
think of or consider the ordinary person. Only the pope, the king and
God are important and everything else was to be disposed of by God and
his representatives on earth.

The attitudes of these two offices and the men who occupied them
gained adherants in the intellectual life on both sides. In the end,
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of course the authority of the kings won out and the church was seldom
able to exercise authority over a state again. However, although much
of

the

literature

that

survives is concerned with the church/state

conflict, other political and social trends, which concern the concept
of the individual were growing.

Walter Ullman's magnificent book: The Individual
helped

to

and

Society

in

the Middle Ages

(69) has

refocus medieval studies in

fundamental ways.

He feels that medieval students did not distinguish

between the individual as a subject and the individual as

a citizen.

(70) He adds:

In a rough sense one may well say that for the
larger part of the Middle Ages it
was
the
individual as a subject that dominated the scene,
while in the later Middle Ages and in the modern
period the subject was gradually supplanted by the
citizen. (71)

Ullman claimed that from Rome, the Middle Ages
concept

of

inherited

the

society as a corporation, and when this idea was added to

ecclesiastical thinking, the Christian

had

become

a member

of

an

"all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the church... a full member
of

the 'corpus Christi' was effected by his baptism." (72) This idea

is not unique to Ullman, as Colin Morris also says: "The church is the
body of Christ, each member a limb in it. All believers share in the
one

Spirit, all

are stones in the living Temple." (73) What Ullman
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does add to medieval studies is the emphasis on the individual that he
perceived stemming both from Feudalism and from the church.

First, he gives what most medievalists have perceived before, that
people were called the 'corpus Christi', the faithful, the church, the
congregation- all words depicting unity, a oneness which

denied

the

autonomy of the individual. "The individual's standing within society
was based upon his office or

his official function." (74) Their

status, their identity depended on the grace of the king

and without

it they had no place in society. Henry IV had written to Gregory as
if God had entrusted him directly with His people.

Ullman presents

the concept of the munt (75) of the king. He claims that this concept
was

crucial

to all medieval kingdoms. The 'munt' was similar to a

'guardianship' over a minor.
bride was transferred

In Anglo-Saxon England, the 'munt' of a

from

the parents

to the bridgegroom.

The

kingdom was considered to be entrusted into the hands of the king itfho
was to protect and guide his subjects. The medieval jury was required
to give unanimous decisions

on certain

occasions, and they were

certainly functioning, not as themselves, but

as

country.

give indications of the

(76)

Interdicts

and Depositions

spokesmen

for

the

collective punishments common at the time. Other personal clues also
point

to

the lack

of

individual

identity:

anonymity of writers,

architects, etc., and the lack of individuality in hand writing.

(77)
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The attacks

on heresy were

individual's obedience

important

to it, were

because

the bonds

faith, and the

that held

society

together, so that an attack on the faith was an act of treason. (78)
The Jewish respect for the law continued at this time:
...All the individual bodies may and will die, but
what cannot die is the idea of law, the idea of
right order, which holds the public and corporate
body
together and which, therefore, possessed
sempiternity. (79)
Ullman's perception of an organic, corporate whole
society

that was

the

of medieval ages is supported by other scholars. The origin

of the organic state has its source in the thought of Cicero according
to some scholars.
was a

stable

(80) Another states: "Medieval

compound

political

thought

of both organic and individualistic theory."

(81) Everything that Ullman mentioned above

is supported

by

other

scholars with slight variations.

As for individualism, Ullman sees the source of our modern concept
in the law, in feudalism, and in the advent of the study of Aristotle.
Tliere were

two systems of law: customary or unwritten law, which had

to have some participation by the people; and

the written

law from

superior sources which contained the duty to obey. These systems were
often

in conflict.

Constantine the Great

The code of Justinian
that no customary

imperial or enacted law. (82)

contained

law could

a

law by

abrogate

any
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Personal

relationships and oaths of fealty were often cemented by

holy relics: a piece of the true cross or the bones of a saint.
a

man

gave

involved.

his

oath, his

The wealthy and

simple, later

on, to

whole

relationship

the powerful

soon

When

with God was also

found

it

relatively

find a priest who would absolve them of their

obligation on condition that they would pay a penance (usually to
church

and

the priest) for their sin of breaking their oath or word.

Common law was often based on the customs built
reverence

up by

the

a personal,

relationship as well as a legal one. The contract could be

repudiated if either side did not fulfill the obligations.
feudal

original

paid to oaths. Part of the unwritten or common law was the

laws or principles of feudalism. The oath of fealty was
religious

the

(83)

The

tendency was to reduce all social and political organizations

"to a network of contractual bonds between pairs of individuals." (84)
"The bonds of society were personal and tribal, and the idea of public
authority progressively disappeared, to
medieval

Europe

had

no

such

an

extent

that

early

word corresponding to the respublica of the

Roman world or the in the modern age." (85)

There are many examples to support this thesis:

I, Richard Altemir... swear that from this hour
forward I xrill be faithful to you, the lord Count
Raymond... (and he goes on to mention places and
lands he pledges to leave to his lord)... But I
shall give to you as many times as you ask it of
me,
personally
or through your messengers...
without deceiving you... (86)
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Gadbert of Burges (1127) describes the earliest description of an act
of homage during the granting of a fief:
The count asked each one if he wished to become
wholly his man, and the latter replied, "I so
wish", and tri.th his his hands clasped and enclosed
by those of the count, they were bound together by
a kiss.
Secondly, he who had done homage pledged
his faith to the count's spokesman in these xvords:
"I promise on my faith that I will henceforth be
faithful to Count William and that I will maintain
my homage toward him completely against everyone,
in good faith and without guile.(87)
One result

or

culmination

of

the

individualizing

process

of

feudalism was the thirty-ninth Article of the Magna Carta:
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or
disseized, or outlaxved, or exiled, or in any way
harmed - nor will we go upon or send upon him save by the laxvful judgement of his peers or by the
law of the land. (88)
This article is the legal keystone in

individualism

in the

English

world. No longer did the king have the right to rule according to his
own will. The barons revolted because the king had

set aside

common

law that had arisen from feudal sources. Common law rapidly grexv in
influence. Edward Ill's coronation medal in 1327 had
will

of

inscribed

the people gives law" and in the 1300's Chief Justice Thorpe

said that parliament represented the 'body of all the realm' and
law of

"the

"the

the land is made in parliament by the king and the spiritual

and temporal lords and the whole community of the realm." (89)
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John's grandson, Edward I, accepted the reality
by

the people

in ruling

the country.

of

participation

In his "Writ of Summons of

Representatives of the Countries and Boroughs to Parliament", he

says

he "intends to have a consultation and meeting with the earls, barons
and other principal men of our kingdom", and, more
these representatives

"are

to have full

importantly,

that

and sufficient power for

themselves and for the community of the aforesaid country... then and
there for

doing what shall then be ordained according to the common

counsel in the premises..." (90) The people of England xvere not
to be consulted, but

also were

only

to have power to implement their

decisions.

The 'power of the people' was to be used by Richard II, almost one
hundred years
National

later, to end

direct papal

influence

in Britain.

church offices were to be filled by free elections, national

church money xvas to remain in the country, and so on, and all
authority
men

of

on the

"Our lord the King... with the assent of all the great

and the commons of the said realm."

(91) Philip

IV of

France

already had destroyed the authority of the papacy in that country, so
now the only major country left where papal authority still held

sway

xras the weakened Holy Roman Empire. Without a strong civil authority
in Germany, that country had
Reformation

to wait

until

the advent

of the

to finish the authority of the church. Not only had the
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church and the state separated conceptually and practically
state

but

the

had superceded the church so that the latter was now subject to

the former, instead of the other way around. Noxv national
xras greater

than papal

authority

and

only

authority

the conscience of the

individual was left for 'divine' influence.

A

new

awareness

of

the

individual

was

growing

in

western

civilization,d Art started to show individuals as opposed to idealized
types.

(92)

A

nexv distinction was made betxveen the individual as a

person and as a citizen. The first translator
William

of Aristotle's works,

of Moerbeke, had to coin a new xrord, politizare, a verb, to

mean 'an individual in his
translate

the

original

capacity

Greek.

as a

citizen',

in

order

(93) Intellectual life in the Middle

Ages is usually seen to be heavily oriented tox^ard theological
and

axiray

from

the

concerns

of

the

ordinary

issues

individual.

organicism, corporativeness of the Christian society was perceived
be

the

only

description

of

society possible.

intellectual life was seen to be
reality, however, the

to

without

intellectual

In

substantive

life was

one

The
to

addition, the
conflict.

of

In

turmoil and

conflict. Four streams of classical thought continued into the Middle
Ages:

Stoicism

and

Epicureanism; Old Testament thought; Platonism;

and Aristotelianism. Each had its oxvn perspective of
Only Averroism

fought

against

building in the Middle Ages.

the

individual.

the individualizing process that xras
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One of the most potent conflicts revolved around the question
whether

faith

alone was the only foundation of knowledge.

and Aristotelian tradition emphasized reason
knowledge

and

that

reason was, by

as being

a

nature, a part

of

The Stoic
source

of

of man. (94)

Marsilius of Padua looked to reason to discover knowledge:

I shall divide my proposed work
into
three
discourses.
In the first I shall demonstrate my
viextfs by sure methods discovered by the human
intellect, based upon propositions self-evident to
every mind not corrupted by nature, custom, or
perverted emotion.
In the second discourse, the
things which I shall believe myself to
have
demonstrated
I
shall
confirm by established
testimonies of the eternal truth.... (95)

Marsilius carried his belief in reason to the Bible
him

the

To

accept

"And it is

the

authority

indeed
of

the

the

of

the priests without

question

was

individual could draw his own conclusions.

remarkable

if we

are

obliged

to believe

glossators

rather

than Christ, whoever be that

glossator, even a saint, and especially since he makes this
not as glossator but on his own understanding." (96)
fact

For

individual must be free to interpret the Bible for himself.

unnecessary, because

authority

itself.

that Marsilius

xvas forced

the

assertion

Considering the

to flee the papacy to the court of

Ludwig of Bavaria in Nuremberg after he had finished the book in 1324,
it is an interesting
similar,

if more

coincidence

pronounced,

that

Luther

conclusion

should

almost

arrive

at

a

two hundred years
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later.

Aquinas also believes in the use
justice

involve the reason of man.

of

reason.

For

him

law and

"Therefore all laws, in so far as

they partake of right reason, are derived from the external law." (97)
William of Ockham went even further and adopted the 'original state of
nature' concept of the stoics, where the
common

earth

belonged

all

in

and all men xvere free, and claimed that 'natural rights' could

not be put aside by positive law, and reason was the
to

to

ensure

that

natural

instrument

used

laxv and justice were the foundations of any

community. (99) This did not mean that Ockham did not see his xvorld as
a corporate society (99), but that that
man's

own nature. Marsilius

also

corporation was

saw his

society

founded

as

on

a natural

phenomenon (100) but, again it xvas based on reason and man's nature.
He

also added that the state made its oxvn laws, and they were made by

or xvith the consent of its citizenry. Non-human
called

laxvs could

not be

laws properly because they lacked an element of consent (101):

The authority to make the laws belongs... to the
whole body of citizens or to the weightier part
thereof... (102)
An opposition to reason as a source of knowledge

was

formidable.

Petrus Damiani, Bernard of Clairvaux (103) and the papacy itself were
determined that faith was to be the sole source of knowledge. A major
thinker in Medieval Political thought, John of Salisbury, also placed
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the foundation

of

the

state

on the 'divine', but he supported the

kings, against the papacy. As Henry IV had
directly

appointed

by God,

declared

himself

so did John believe. He had no clear

conception of the difference between the individual as person
citizen.

Hoxvever, he

to be

did x\rant to return

and

as

to a 'state of nature'

without kings and kingdoms but living in peace, but it xvas a 'state of
nature' before the fall of man
'commonxvealth'

can

and

sin necessitated

rulers.

only flourish "when the higher members shield the

lower, and the lower respond faithfully and fully in like measure
the

just demands

The

to

of their superiors, so that each and all are as it

xvere members one of another by a sort of reciprocity." (104)

Because

the ruler was appointed to rule by God, he could see no xvay in xvhich a
tyrant could be removed from office. To kill a king was to break your
oath of fealty. (105) Yet, even he has a sense of the individual:
Liberty means
judging
everything
freely in
accordance with one's individual judgement, and
does not hesitate to reprove what it sees opposed
to good morals. (106)
John's individual judgement was based on the believer's

participation

in a higher moral law. The individual was obligated to oxve obedience
to the higher laws before the positive laws of man.

John of Salisbury, hoxvever, lived long before John, the king

of

England. Medieval thought had changed considerably, as I have pointed
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out.

John's

'individual judgement' became a right to participate in

the 'justice' of the state by participating in making and applying the
laxvs themselves. By the early 1300's, Durandus
jurist, declared

that

secular

power

had

de

San

Porciano, a

jurisdiction over men as

citizens because there was secular legitimate power

in non-Christian

countries. (107) Even Peter Abelard, who was an older contemporary of
John

of

Salisbury, had

a more modern viewpoint of man: "Although

people say that Socrates and Plato are one in their humanity, how can
that

be

accepted, when it is obvious that all men are different from

each other both in matter and in form." (108) Albert the Great made it
clear that to rely on revelation for explanations of natural phenomena
would be absurd.

For him, experience was the only guide.

(109)

His

pupil, Aquinas, believed the reason and revelation were two different
expressions of the same truth.

"The divine right

does

not

abrogate

the human right which originates in reason." (110)

By

the

sixteenth

century,

the struggles of the Middle Ages had

resolved themselves. Having inherited

the

concepts

of

divine, or

higher, and positive, or lower, laws, the medieval man had raised the
positive laxvs to be equal to the higher
justification,

inception

and

laws

and

to

have

enactment - the citizens of the state.

The battle for ultimate sovereignty between the church and
ended

in a

rout

its own

the

state

of the church, particularly in the Avignon period.

The church became a national institution subject, as

an

institution,
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to

the state. Emerging with powers to enact legislation, the commons

became a self-sufficient justification for the state.

In the battle between the state and the papacy, the struggle
the

conscience

of

the individual was the keenest. As a result, nexv

ideas about individual judgement and
were

introduced.

over

the non-reliance

on

authority

Reason became as important as faith, and reason had

its oxvn judgement. Using the stoic concept of nature and Aristotle's
declaration
had

found

that man
the

justification
political

link

for

and

was by nature a social being, medieval thought
between

and

'reason'

sufficient

the individual to use his own judgement on social,

theological

'individualized'.

'nature'

Justus

that it was necessary not

questions.
Lipsius, a
to

oppose

nature, but, while maintaining

God

had

become

further

stoicist, was able to believe

the

universal

those, man

had

laws

of

human

to follow his oxvn

particular nature, and the only way to understand this relatinship xvas
through reason. (Ill)

Man, no longer an object of misery and wretchedness, had
"the most

fortunate

of

creatures

and

consequently

become

worthy of all

admiration...

to be envied... even by the stars and by minds

beyond

this world."

(112) Another writer says, in a fable, that man mimics

the gods and they marvel so at man that he is invited to join them and
to be

one

of

them.

(113)

Nicholas

Cusanus

believed

that
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participation in the divine meant that every spiritual being must have
its centre xvithin itself.

(114)

In order

to attack and defeat

Averroism, dominant in Italian Universities in the 14th, 15th and into
the 16th century, other

schools had

to emphasize

the

self, the

individual. Eventually, the idea that man xvas a spiritual individual,
and

that he recognized himself

as

such, prevailed. (115) A nexv

concept had been introduced. The ideal of man
but

it xvas one

that xvas intimately

included

'autonomy',

linked to the divine. Man's

autonomy was related to his conscience, his soul, the religious centre
of his being.

The emphasis

of my

argument has been on the

concept

of

'individualism', and as such it has emphasized those areas indicating
its presence and growth. The concept was by no means clear
of

the late

15th and

to those

early sixteenth century, or even later. Sir

Thomas Elyot, in his The Book Named the Governor, (116) viewed society
as an organism:

A public
sundry
disposed
rule and

xveal is a body living,
estates and degrees
by the order of equity
moderation of reason.

Order is found in society as it is
willed

it

so.

compact or made of
of men, which is
and governed by the
(117)
in all

things because God

has

Without order, there would be perpetual conflict and

society would be

destroyed

resulting

in the perishing

of

the
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individual.
by God.
lessor

Order reflects the diversity in intellectual gifts given

Those with greater gifts of
gifts

understanding,

aid

those xvith

by "detaining of other within the sounds of reason" and

to guide them. Understanding and reason provide the means to
and

commodious

living'

when

shown

to

'others

of

'virtue
inferior

understanding' 'through the glass of authority.' (118)

Another Englishman also viewed society in a medieval
wrote his paper in 1606. (119)
Plato imagined man to be an heavenlie plant; his
head to be the roote; his bulke, the stocke; his
armes and leggs the branches; and his root to draw
his sapp from the heavens to Feede therewith the
under
parts, spreading downeward towardes the
earth. Such a plantation do I conceive in the
institution of a State politique: the sovereigne
head to be designed, inspired, depending, and
protected
from above, and the body with the
out-growing parts thereof, to receive nourishment,
strength, flourishing, and fruitfulness from that
root of a rightful regiment. (120)
He does add provisos:
These good duties of kindly subjection to kingly
power, I leave to the consideration and conscience
of every true subject... (121)
And:

In man the soule ruleth by reason, and in the state
the soveraigne governeth by laxves (122)

sense, yet
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Both men relied on reason as one foundation of
reason was

founded

the

laws

of

the

state; and

upon

the state. Hoxvever, it was God's

ordinance that there be a ruler and the ruled a natural order. Reason
was to be used to perceive His ordinances.

The most important writer of

the

age was

Niccolo Machiavelli.

Many books on political philosophy start with Machiavelli because they
consider

him to be the beginning of the modern age. John Plamenatz's

work is titled: Man
Important

Social And

and

Society A

Political

Critical

Theories

Examination

of

Some

From Machiavelli to Marx:

(123)

... it is with Machiavelli that modern social and
political theory really begins.
Indeed, he is
often more modern in outlook, more theological,
less a priori, and more down-to-earth than many of
the great men who came after him. (124)
However, Plamenatz points out a

'great

omission'

of Machiavelli's:

"he was not interested in representative government" and he paid scant
attention to the question of freedom. (125)

That Machiavelli
surprise

considering

should

be

anti-theological

the Averroist

dominance

ought
of

to

the

be

no

Italian

universities at that time. Averroes had proclaimed reason superior to
revelation, even if it was a single active intellect for all mankind.
(126) 'Political Averroism' had a number of emphases that are found in
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Machiavelli:

Skepticism about the ability of faith and religion
to
correspond to the demands and results of
rational inquiry; veneration for Aristotle and
denigration of traditional religious authorities;
religious
indifferentism;
secularism
and
anti-clericalism; and determinism. (127)
The Averroists
the

fexv that

Machiavelli

also made a sharp distinction betxveen the masses and
can

pays

understand

little

knowledge.

Throughout

The Prince,

attention to the masses except as subjects.

(128) They can be ruled by arms,

(129) and money

(130) but

they

usually respond to a ruler who does not oppress them: "you can satisfy
the people, because, for their object is more righteous than that of
the nobles, the latter wishing to
desire

oppress, xvhilst

the

former

not to be oppressed." (131) Machiavelli was more interested in

the structure of the state and the power of the state than he
the moral

ends

of

the

itself...

all

the

embraces"

and

"nothing

worked.

only

state.

authority
is

(132)

there

The

was

in

state "contains xvithin

is whithin

the

territory

it

superior to it." (133) Justice was what

"Hence, it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his oxvn

to know how

to

do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to

necessity." (134) He goes on to add

that

he will

be

speaking

of

reality not some imaginary things about rulers.

While

The

Prince

xvas widely read and widely condemned, another
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book, xvritten txvo years later, became
Thomas More's Utopia.

(135)

think of the people and

to

'variable'

easy

and, while

almost

as widely

read: Sir

More, hoxvever, was more inclined to

trust

them.

Machiavelli

found

to persuade, hard to 'fix them in a

persuasion'. (136) More described the people as having notions
their

society

people

about

and values, partly by customs and habits and partly by

education. All the inhabitants read and study and xvere not fooled

by

"chimeras and fantastical images made in the mind" (137):

None of them could comprehend what xve meant when xve
talked to them of a man in the abstract as common
to all men in particular, (so that though we spoke
of him as a thing that xve could point at with our
fingers, yet none of them could perceive him,) and
yet distinct from every one, as if he xvere some
monstrous colossus or giant. (138)
More was evidently attacking the common belief that mankind
made

up

of individuals.

For him, people should learn, study and use

their oxvn judgement. Everyone
belonging

to

should

have

a

right

by

to

everything

the state, so "no private man can xvant anything". (139)

His focus of study xvas on man, autonomous man, man
governed

was not

his

oxvn reason.

That

as

an

individual

he had to fight for the concept

indicates that it xvas not the common viexvpoint of his age, but it xvas
a

concept xvithin the human perception of his age so that others could

understand.
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The Reformation and Social Contract

Werner Stark has written that xvhereas Catholicism:

is an incarnation of the principle...
called
community:
the whole
is before the parts.
Calvinism, on the other hand, is a product of the
principle of Association: the parts are before the
whole. Catholicism thinks in terms of organic
unity; it is collectivistic.
Calvinism for its
part thinks in terms of contractualism; it is
individualistic. (140)
Max Weber came to a similar conclusion in his The Protestant
(141)

Religious

individualism

had

arrived

triumphant

Ethic.
in

the

Reformation. No longer was there to be any intermediaries betxveen the
believer

and his God. The responsibility for his soul xvas his alone

and he was to 'come' to God in his way.

The

covenant, mentioned

in

Ezekiel, xvas the new spiritual contract.

Although

others had thought of similar ideas before, this xvas the

first time xvhen masses of people believed
brought

literature

it.

of

the

press

to the masses, and Reinhold Niebuhr called it the

"predemocratic triumph of the xvritten language
loyalties

The printing

over more

parochial

tribe and dialect." (142) Education of the masses

was another cause of the spread of such a nexv concept.
Calvin both advocated

and worked

hard

for mass

Luther

and

education.

The

individual had to understand and knoxv what the Bible said in order

to
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interpret

it

for himself and find salvation through his faith alone.

The individualistic, atomistic
destroyed

the

collectivist

potential

or

organic

in religion
idea

of

erupted

and

the church or the

'universalis fidelis' into a collection of Christians -

a

Fellowship

of believers. People became part of the physical or mechanical order,
having as much in common as a rock collection or potted plants.

It is at this point in the history of 'individualism' that we must
reduce our area of study further. Of western society, those countries
noted

for

their

Catholic

heritage must

be

left

aside.

The

counter-revolution retained the organic overtones that are implicit in
the Catholic churches of Spain, Portugal, Italy and so on, xvhile the
Orthodox

church was

resistant

inscription

wrote

'if

it

I were

is from

of

almost all our political thought originates. Denmark
who

and

parts

countries

Soren Kierkegaard

concepts

Only

adopted

produced

new

individualism.

northern Europe
that

the

to

to

these

desire

an

for my toombstone, I should desire none other than "That

Individual" '.(143) England produced Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham,
Mill, Ayer

and

so

on. Germany presented the world a schizophrenic

viewpoint with Prussia on one
Burckhardt

side

and Kant, Luther, Stirner

and

on the other. France, too, was split in its allegiance to

various concepts. Bodin, Rousseau and Saint-Simon were opposed to de
Bonald, de Maistre and Balzac.

84

Nexv concepts

of man needed

new concepts of the state and new

justification for the state structure. Whereas the Middle Ages had
looked

upon

society

as a body, or a xvhole unit, the nexv concept saw

society as an assembly of units, and the king xvas no longer
of

the societal

the head

body but something else - a unit or a man who rules

other units or men. Calvin and Luther quoted St. Paul in Romans
believed

the ruler xvas appointed

by God

and ought to be obeyed.

Others felt that since each Christian was ruled by the Holy Spirit
one needs another

and

no

temporal ruler. The justification for a society,

and its source of justice, was the social

contract, a concept

that

ruled Protestant influenced areas from 1600 to 1800.

The key to the new age belongs to Martin Luther when he said:

...we are all priests... and have all one faith,
one Gospel, one Sacrament; how then should we not
have the power of discerning and judging what is
right or wrong in matters of faith? U 4 4 )
In another tract he added two propositions:
A Christian is a perfectly free lord of all,
subject to none. A Christian is a perfectly
dutiful servant of all, subject to all. (145)
Luther himself did not realize what he was unleashing
Others

forgot

the

on

the xvorld.

second proposition rapidly and talked only of the

'perfectly free lord of all'. It xvas the triumph of Autonomy.
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John Calvin's doctrines took

the

concepts

further

than Luther

would have wished:

Now, since the consciences of believers, being
privileged xvith liberty..., have been delivered by
the favour of Christ from all necessary obligations
to the observance of those things in which the Lord
has been pleased they should be left free, xve
conclude that they are exempt from all human
authority... (146)
Calvin wished

to

'lock' the 'pre-elected' believer into the plan of

God. Although he was not as subtle a thinker as Luther, his influence
was as great, if not greater. Three major forces in Europe: Hugenot
in France, Presbyterian

in Scotland,

deeply influenced by Calvin.
to his

and

Puritan in England were

Eventually the tone of absolute

freedom

arguments was carried to the new world, and his plan to chain

the individual to God's plan dissipated in a nexv anti-religious xvorld.

In England,

it xvas the

state

that

changed

churches

beginning, but soon the Puritans became most influential.
they were

in the

In the end

strong enough to enable Parliament to defeat, try, convict

and destroy a king. Although a supporter of the king, the first great
thinker to recognize the new political concepts, Thomas Hobbes, found
any

religious reason or justification for the state inadequate.

Both

the Stuarts and the Puritans founded their theories on God's will.
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Hoxvever, a nexv era in
results

science

had

arrived,

and

the

startling

in science had a profound affect on political attitudes. The

grandest scientific design attempted in England was by Francis Bacon.
He xvanted

to

supplant

all previous philosopies by a new philosophy

founded on rigorous scientific observations:

There was but one course left, therefore - to try
the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to
commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts,
and all human knowledge, raised upon the proper
foundations. (147)
He wanted to:

...establish forever a true and lawful marriage
betxveen the empirical and the rational faculty, the
unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of
xvhich has thrown into confusion all the affairs of
the human family. (148)
Hobbes xvas a philosopher
political theory

and

he

was

long before he turned his thoughts on
deeply

impressed

by

the

scientific

advances of his age. With a background in science and philosophy, and
influenced

by

both

thought and found
empirical

Bacon

it based

evidence.

He

and Rene Descartes, he examined political
on

authoritative

decided

to

use

sources

scientific

and not

on

principles to

examine the political spectrum.

In De Cive, Hobbes tells his readers that he xvishes to

describe
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men "first as men; then as subjects, lastly, as Christians." (149) He
does describe men as "made fit

for society not by nature, but by

education" and that although man may be born to desire society, he
may not be born fit

for it. (150) This is a grand break from the

previously accepted doctrine by Aristotle.

'Natural' man is moved

to

society by the "mutual fear they had of each other". In the state of
nature every man has a right to all, and because there are no laws
nature

to break, everything

is permissable.

driven by fear to make an agreement in which he
rights for security.

in

(151) Man, then, is
trades many of his

It is in forming this agreement or contract that

man creates the bonds of society. Breaking trust with the agreement
is the source of injustice. (152) He
that

society i.e.

also

specifically points out

the contract, is founded on reason and not on the

nature of man. (153)

Man as man is a collection of individuals with little or no social
or organic contact between them, driven by

self-regard

and natural

desires. Reason rescues man and, seeking security above everything
else, trades the natural rights for
rights.

The resulting

contract

secure and well

civil

supercedes the natural laws or the

laws of God. Natural and moral laws are one but
account

defined

they are of no

except where the conscience is concerned. When positive and

moral laxv conflict, then externally it is the positive law that must
hold

sway.

(154)

The contract, law and the Leviathan are all the

result of man's reason, and they are artificial creations:
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With Hobbes the power of Christian tradition is for
the first time fully broken by a clear-headed and
cold-hearted rationalism. (155)

All

temporal

authority,

and

perhaps

not only human authority,

springs from the consent of the people subject to it, yet Hobbes was
reluctant

to permit the people to overthrow a tyrant. John Locke xvas

not as reluctant. Rejecting the 'short nasty and brutish' aspects

of

natural man, Locke believed that man originally was good and that only
conflict

over

rights

forced man

to

seek

society

contract. Man had perfect freedom to do as he wished
actions, his

possessions

and

Man

concerning

reason was

For

Locke, reason was

the

Through his reason, man entered into the
his

natural

concept

more

role to play than in Hobbes. The latter believed that reason

was merely a means of determining the best means
desires.

that

had only to consult his oxvn reason to knoxv he ought not to

kill himself or harm others. (156) In Locke, reason has a much
central

his

himself, but he did not have license.

Nature had laws and all men were subject to it, and
laxv.

and the social

that

independent".

rights

and

all men
(157)

of

foundation
social

satisfying

the

of natural law.

contract, preserved

freedoms. The social contract reflects the

are, "by

nature, all

free,

equal

and

The first principle of the social contract must

be majority rule, and everyone must consent to the rule. Only in this
manner can the society act for all yet retain as much of
freedom

as possible.

the natural

(158) A tyrant, by his very nature breaks the
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spirit of that first principle, so on that basis, the people

have a

right to rebel.

Hobbes

and Rousseau felt that life outside a state was unsuitable

for human needs. Locke, however, believed that man
contract

to protect

formed

a

social

his possessions. (159) C.B. MacPherson latched

onto this idea and presented his concept of 'possessive individualism'
as the central assumption of liberal political theory:

The core of Locke's individualism is the assertion
that every man is naturally the sole proprietor of
his oxvn person and capacities - the absolute
proprietor in the sense that he owes nothing to
society for them - and especially the absolute
proprietor of his capacity to labour. (160)
The

rights, then, are for those with property, for it is among these

that the state xvas made.
until

It is interesting that in

English

society,

the late 19th century, there were that class xvhich consisted of

gentlemen, and another class which xvas the masses, however, it is not
a

central core to the concept of individualism.

"I" as the pilot of the ship i.e. the body.
body.

This

did not mean

that

divided into two classes: those
xvithout.

DesCartes

"I"'s

DesCartes viewed the

The

"I" possessed

the

viexved mankind as being

possessing

bodies

and

those
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Rousseau

added

to

the

social contract theory, the concept that

morality is formed in the process of making the contract. Men have no
rights or duties except towards other men, and only in society do men
realize xvhat these

rights

and duties are. (161) This

'morality'

process affects men so that nexv ideas, new values and new goals
that were

impossible

beyond society.

The state of nature xvas not a

bad place to be, according to Rousseau. He believed
xvas created

exist

by the rich to protect property.

that

the

state

This has led men to be

more succeptible to vice than virtue, and he has been corrupted.

Yet

the individual has new rights and status under the contract:

Each of us puts his person and all his poxver in
common under the supreme direction of the general
will, and, in our corporate capacity, xve receive
each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
(162)

However, a

totalitarian

element

enters

into

his scheme. The

individuals give up all their rights and freedoms in the contract, and
in return each becomes a part of the whole - no
than

another.

The

part

being

greater

whole becomes the general will and it represents

every single part. As a result:

...the sovereign, being formed wholly of
individuals who compose it, neither has nor
have any interest
contrary
to
theirs;
consequently the sovereign power need give
quarantee to its subjects...

the
can
and
no
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The social contract tacitly includes the principle:

...that xvhoever refuses to obey the general will
shall be compelled to do so by the whole body.
This means nothing less than that he will be forced
to be free; for this is the condition which...
secures him against all personal dependence...
(163)
The Social Contract
Hobbes

theory

had

gone

through

a metamorphesis.

believed that to escape a nasty and brutish natural state, all

power had to be placed in the hands of a Leviatan.
state

Locke

found

the

of nature more pleasing but reason persuaded men to place power

in the hands of the aristocracy in order to ensure the privileges

of

property. However, Rousseau xvanted to put all the power in the concept
of

the general

will which was the xvill of all the people as a unit.

Hobbes felt the state gave security in place of freedom xvhile Rousseau
felt the state gave a kind of freedom to the people.

The

now involved in an 'ought' or teleological situation.

It is no longer

the present

tense

state was

'Greatest Good' but a future tense 'greatest good

for the individual'. Man had to have his nature changed by the state.

Walter Ullman has said that the Middle Ages produced a division of
concepts between man
development

of

the

as

social

have gained the upper hand.
bonds

of

subject

and man

as

citizen.

In

the

contract theory, man as citizen seems to
In Rousseau we find man's nature and his

citizenship are founded in society or the state.

In Hobbes
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xve find indications that man as
society,

i.e.,

religious

worshippers. Man as a

a xvorshipper

authority

citizen

is

owes

is also

due

to

a number

found

in a

the consent of the

of

his

rights

and

freedoms

to man in nature according to Locke, but Hobbes and Rousseau

believed

these were

Individualism

had

traded

for

civil

rights

and

freedoms.

arrived at a point where the individual had xvithin

himself the necessary justification for morality for law and
state.

No

other foundation xvas necessary.

for

From the 18th century to

the present, much of the development of individualism xvas due
explanations

to

the

of what the characteristics of an individual are. Kant

found that the basis of man's autonomy was his reason; Bentham
that

the

found

the state or society was but an aggregate of individuals brought

together by the calculations
entity was

each

individual.

The

only human

the autonomous, separate, isolate, atomistic, unique, or

distinct individual.
community,

of

All

state, and

other

human

concepts

such

as

society,

nation are merely tools or constructs of each

individual mind. All the ties that had absorbed the individual of the
tribes had been broken in the religious evolvement of
relationship

of

the

the one soul and his God. With the advent of Deism,

even that final tie xvith God had been broken for God no
or

took

an interest in the world he created.

longer

cared

Oakshott's thesis that

individualism erupts after the breakdoxvn of an integrated
worthxvhile

individual

society

is

if we narrow our scope to the last eight hundred years of

xvestern history. However, other

integrated

societies

have broken
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apart

yet

individualism

as xve knoxv it

had

not occurred before.

Individualism must have a cultural perception of its basic
or

viexvpoint

embedded

in

principles

the previous culture before its eruption,

otherwise a new form of an integrated culture xvill emerge again. Were
class or other social forms the sole focus of study, then we
the

breakdown

can

see

occurring. However, what I xvould claim, and I believe

have shoxvn, is that the change betxveen the time of John

of

Salisbury

and that of Kant, is a natural progression given the underlying themes
and the drives within the culture itself. No breakdoxvn occurred, only
a

transformation.

The

impetus

for

creating

the

concept

individual as we knoxv it today, came from the fundamental

of the

changes

in

the theological concepts in the last three thousand years:from the new
covenant

in the

Babylonian

captivity

to

the concept of salvation

created by Jesus, to the Deistic God of the sixteenth and
centuries.
largely

the

The

seventeenth

concept of the individual as the basic human unit is

creation

of, or

theological concepts of the

the by-product

of,

Judeo-Christian ethos.

the

evolving
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Let us suppose that the concept of the
unit

individual

as

the basic

of society, or the basic human unit, is indeed a derivative of a

theological process. Should
true

such a development

of

the

concept

be

then how xve viexv the human and the human culture ought to be

reviewed. What I would like to do in
present

a picture

the

folloxving

section

is

to

of a basic human unit that is not the individual,

nor is it the state, nor is it society.

The

idea

is

to present

a

plausible depiction of a human unit other than that of the individual,
yet

one xvhich is not a societally holistic unit. Should a nexv human

unit be depicted, and should it be an acceptable hypothesis warranting
further investigation, then I shall have accomplished my purpose.

For the most part, the starting point for
society

is

that xvhich the

the

study

of man

in

author believes to be uniquely human in

contradistinction to all other things. For one it is "consciousness",
for another it is "rights", for another it may be the ability
tools,

symbols, or

nature, and so on.

to use

I xvish to start by claiming

that man(xvhatever the unit) is

a

organism,

It is not a claim that man is only an

a biological entity.

creature, an

animate

being, an

organism, it is but a starting point. As a biological entity, it has
developed through a biological process and xve must examine its origin,
reproduction,

structure, groxvth

begin, as Hegel
consciousness

does

and

in his

and

The

development

Phenomenan

as a species. To

of Mind, xvith one

then examine the process of awareness in an almost
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spatially expanding manner, fails to grasp the duration of
life process.

It may

the

human

be claimed that consciousness as such is not

inherited, but there are few doubts that life itself is inherited.
a fundamental level are the biological processes.
so

does

the

all

that is human.

Should they cease,

(I am in agreement xvith St. Thomas

that the soul by itself is not a person.) Should consciousness
under

On

cease

certain circumstances, the body can continue to live, to dream,

and even to think.

I do not intend that the body and the mind are txvo

separate entities or even that they are entities. Consciousness is an
ascription of the human.

Through the examination of the history of the life process and the
biological development of the human, I hope to
xvhich xvill enable

us

to

for

man

of

for

the

From these

basic

human

in community, and (in Part Three) for man in society.

It may be that my definitions of
examination

some principles

understand the "mind of man".

principles, I hope to establish the foundation
unit,

find

the

"community"

distinctions

betxveen

and

the

"society"

and my

two concepts will be

prejudiced for I use, what some people criticize as conservative, the
concepts

outlined by Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies.

used their concepts because of the importance they attached
txvo concepts
these concepts
concepts

is

to

I have
these

and

their

differences, and their intense interest in

in

their

theories.

exceptional

in

its

Toennies' xvork on

scope

and erudition.

these txvo
Each has an
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exact, clear and consistent image of xvhat the concepts mean
they

differ.

It is for this reason I "purloined" their descriptions.

In the Introduction, it was claimed that there were four
linked

to

the

"individual":

"personality", 3) "autonomy
completeness". The

or

The

self-governing",

and

4) "being

boundaries

is no

of

each

stone

from

another

are distinct and particular.

the

actual mineral

formation,

necessary relationship betxveen one rock and another nor

its environment. An amoeba is also

a

another

of

amoeba.

The

boundaries

unit

separate

each

are

spatially

distinct

changing) and particular. Hoxvever, there is a necessary
betxveen the

or

first concept involves the simple existent or the

Except for spatial relationships and
there

concepts

1) "individuality or separateness", 2)

spatial element. One stone is a unit separate spatially
stone.

and hoxv

amoeba

and

its

from

(although

relationship

environment and between one amoeba and

another. For the former, the amoeba must interact xvith its environment
in order to live, and for the latter, the amoeba must

interact xvith

other amoeba in order to transmit life.

The "life" element of animate creatures prohibits the isolation of
inanimate objects. There is no simple separate isolated animate being.
Hoxvever, our

original

existing

functioning

something

and

else.

It

definition

could

independently,

claim
i.e.

that
not

the amoeba is
dependent

on

uses various items to maintain its existence, no
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one of them absolutely essential for the maintenance of life. As well,
it is differentiated from
element

did

other

amoeba, i.e.,

2) in order

interact

xvith its environment,

to have life, the amoeba had to"receive" it from

another amoeba. Without life, the amoeba xvould be reduced
of

inanimate

life

offer nexv complications: 1) in order to maintain it, the

amoeba (all animate creatures) must
and,

separate. The

substances.

It

is

life

that

gives

to myriads

the

amoeba its

xvholeness or unity.

When xve speak of individual biological units, we are talking about
units of life. To discuss any biological
account

unit

without

taking

life: the reproduction of life, the maintenance of life, the

structure of life etc., is to lose sight of the xvhole core of
creatures.

animate

Surely the continuation of life is the main purpose of the

amoeba's existence. 1. Restructuring chemical and mineral
and

into

substances

being a food source are by products of this purpose. (No "divine"

or "rational" inference is meant in the use of

the xvord

"purpose".)

The amoeba, therefore, is a "transmitter", taking life from that xvhich
anteceded it and created it, and passing it on to its descendents. The
biologic

unit, then, is

a

unit of life, or if xve think of life as

being a continuing event, a "life-moment".
biologic

unit, it must

hold

transmit or continue life. As
biology

If the amoeba, is to be

a

entirely within itself the ability to

anyone

xvho has

studied

high

school

knows, the amoeba has the ability to separate itself into txvo
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nexv amoeba. It needs no other amoeba to help it produce nexv life. It
is

a

biologic

unit, i.e., an individual unit. It is complete xvithin

itself, because it performs its primary purpose independently.

When a more complex being like man is examined, we find that it is
an animate creature that must interact xvith its environment
to

in order

live, and it, too, must interact xvith other human beings in order

to transmit life. At first perception, the human
differentiated,

from

others

of

separate, i.e.,

its kind. Hoxvever, xvhen xve examine

humans as "life-moments", we find that the human
transmitting

is

is not

capable

of

life, i.e., reproducing itself, independently. The human

being is not a complete biological unit. The

human kind

is

divided

into txvo parts: male and female. In fact, they are divided along lines
that

involve

the reproduction and maintenance of life. The necessary

requirements for the transmission of life are one male and one
xvithin an

anatomically

course, proximity.) The

female

and biologically correct time span. (And, of
"xvhole" that

is needed

to

transmit

life

consists of two human beings: one of each sex; of one of each separate
reproductive physiology.

There

are

additional problems. The old amoeba disappeared as the

txvo nexv ones appeared. Humans, being more complex, do not disappear in
the process of reproduction but, because they must reproduce a highly
ordered

structure, they

are

required

to aid the descendent in its
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life-groxvth and life-maintenance. Part of the life process, then, is
the maintenance
dependent upon

of nexv life
adults

for

by

the

old

survival. Human

life, i.e., a child is
life-transmitters

must

overlap in order for life to continue.

A

biological

being.

If

containing

a

unit, therefore, cannot consist only of one human

biological

the

unit

essential

is

to

be

defined

as

the "whole"

elements necessary for the continuation of

life, then the human biological unit must be the "xvhole" that contains
the male and

female

(capable

of

reproduction) and

the

dependent

infant. There must be a biological orientation in all three abstract
parts to form the "xvhole" biological unit. The
particular

instances

(i.e., the

man, xvoman or child) of the abstract parts need not be the

same in every "whole". For instance, parents reject and adopt babies,
fathers

reject mothers, etc. Nevertheless, the orientation toxvard the

human biological whole must be there or human life xvould cease, and
this

orientation toward a biologic "xvhole" must permeate the entirety

of the human. Our genetic structure, our feelings, our
thinking must

reflect

this

fundamental orientation.

emotions, our
Josiah Royce

recognized an orientation toxvard the other although he did not give it
the same substance as I do.

As a matter of psychology, i.e. of the natural
history of our beliefs, a vague belief in the
existence of our felloxvs seems to antedate, to a
considerable extent, the definite formation of any
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consciousness of ourselves.... We are social beings
first of all by virtue of our inherited instincts,
and xve love, fear, and closely xvatch our felloxvs,
in advance of any definite ideas about xvhat our
felloxvs
really
are.
Our
more
explicit
consciousness that our felloxvs exist is due to a
gradual interpretation of these our deepest social
instincts
Our assurance about our fellows
arises by means of those very interests xvhereby we
gradually come to our oxvn self-consciousness. 2.
Another indication of the inherited "orientation", particularly of
the child for the adult humans are the results
studies.

It

face.3.

An

experimant

of

the

degree

of

empirical

resemblance

xvith rhesus monkeys

discovered that by using various
development

several

is knoxvn, for instance, that a child xvill automatically

smile at any stimulus having a certain
human

of

infant

substitutes

could

be

for

to

by H.F.Harloxv,

real mothers

drastically

a

the

affected.

An

indication that the "need" of the infants for a "mother"figure xvas not
reinforced behavior, xvas one
nipples

for

food

experiment

xvhere a xvire frame with

and a cloth covered frame xvithout nipples for food

xvere placed in the same cage as the young monkeys. The young monkeys
went

to

the cloth covered frame although it gave them no food.

Food

or food giving did not alter their almost instinctive behaviour.4.

When the process of life is considered, each man, xvoman and
is merely

child

a partial "life-moment". A xvhole human "life-moment" (the

basic unit for the transmission

of

life) orients

all

three parts

toxvard a biological "xvhole". What xve normally consider an "individual"
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must

be considered merely a part or an aspect of a "xvhole". Each man,

xvoman and child cannot exist
complete

in and

of

separately,

and

cannot

be

considered

themselves. Only the "life-moment" or the human

biological "whole" can be considered as a human unit, as

a

distinct,

individual entity. The human biological "xvhole" is already a group.

Aristotle pointed

out

these

facts

in his The Politics. In the

second paragraph of the book, he says:

We ... get the best viexv of the matter if xve look
at the natural groxvth of things from the beginning.
The first point is that those which are ineffective
without each other must be united in a pair. For
example the union of male and female is essential
for reproduction, since each is powerless without
the other; and this is not a matter of choice, but
is due to the desire, implanted by nature in both
animals and plants, to propagate one's kind.5.
One could object to the xvords "pair", "union" because they harbour
visions of txvo complete and separate units, for on the next
adds:

Our own observation tells us that every state is an
association of persons formed with a view to some
good purpose. I say "good" because in their actions
all men do in fact aim at what they think good.
Clearly then, as all associations aim at some good,
that one xvhich is supreme and embraces all others
will have also as its aim the supreme good. That is
the association xvhich xve call the state, and that
type of association we call political.6.

page

he
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For Aristotle,

the mating pair (and slaves) form a "household",

and households form a village and several villages form a
some

"good"

state xvith

in mind. The xvhole process was a natural evolution. The

pair mated to reproduce according to the dictates of nature; villages
formed

over

time from the extended family; and states xvere formed by

villages because all the people xvere related or they needed
or

self-sufficiency.

family, the eldest the
foundation

The man
village

ruled
and

security

the household, the father the
the

state. It was

upon

this

that much of medieval political thought xvas founded. It is

still the foundation of Thomist thought today.

However, an association is a xvilled or voluntary
of

units

joined

together, and

to human

than

the

consisting

Aristotle introduces the concept of

"person" and a purpose i.e., the "good". He indicates
more

idea

biological

that

existent. Richard

there

is

M. Weaver

describes the "person" as folloxvs:

It seems a threshold fact that personality is some
kind of integration. The individual xvhora we regard
as having authentic personality appears to possess
a center, and everything that he does is in
relation to this
The true personality is a
psychic unity, preserving its identity and giving a
sort of thematic continuity to the acts of the
individual.7.
Further

on, he

indicates

that

"the

personality

is a morally

oriented unit". This opinion is reflected by Aristotle's use

of

"an
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association

of

persons

formed

xvith a

viexv to some good purpose".

Johannes Messner states: "The development of the human person
light

of

Natural

is, in

Laxv ethics, man's self-realization in accordance

with the order indicated in his nature ". 8. The "person" seems to be
rooted in ethics or morality and is each human's identity.

The philosophical idea of the person is clearly of
Christian origin. In the language of the Greeks,
the word person has no application in philosophy
because Greek Philosophy had no term that meant
xvhat xve call the person. The Greek never prefixed
the "I" to the verb to be, at least never with any
significant
value
so
that
such a sentence
constituted anything fundamental for religion or
philosophy. It was Christ who said of himself that
"I
am
the
way,
the truth and the life,"
synthesizing in the unity of a real and living
person this affirmation of a supreme interior life
and of absolute independence which were impossible
for Parmenides' Being or for Plato's Idea of Good
and making possible, in a concrete, personal, and
historical program, the function of truth, xvay, and
life as the unity of persons.9.
Both
"choice".

ethics or morality and identity are related to "freedom" and
Felix Morley

individualism
the many

indicates

that

"xvhat we

really mean

by

is the latitude of a person to choose for himself among

fruits

of

a

civilization

in which

he

is

an

active

participant."10.

No man

alone need worry about ethics, morality or identity. All

three are socially oriented concepts.

Ill

A human organism is individualized through
a
learning or conditioning process xvithin natural and
human
environments.
Through
affiliations and
participations
are
produced
abilities
to
understand, to appreciate, and to perform within
environments. This complex of abilities constitutes
and characterizes an individual. As xvilliam James
pointed out, the "I" of self is a mine-ness of
relationships and functions.il.
The "person"-individual

seems

to

be

a

focal

subjective

core

involving choice restrained by a social environment. The "person" also
involves

"autonomy"

and it is the autonomous character of each human

that creates individuality. "Autonomy", rationalism and
are

mutually

interdependent.

A

society,

individualism

then,

would

be

inter-subjective, or as Ferdinand Toennies puts it: "Human wills stand
in manifold relations to one another". 12. However, above xve tried

to

shoxv that the human biological "xvhole" xvas already a group.

Jacques

Maritain

and

Ferdinand

Toennies xvere careful

to

distinguish between the txvo concepts of "community" and "society. For
instance, Maritain states in Man and the State:

Both community and society are ethico-social and
truly human, not mere biological realities. But a
community is more of a xvork of nature and more
nearly related to the biological; a society is more
of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the
intellectual
and
spiritual properties of
man
13.
Coming from a Thomist viexvpoint, Maritain insists on the moral
ethical

basis

for

or

both concepts. The "Community" is the "Fact" that
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precedes reason and xvill and acts independently of them "to
common

unconscious

psyche,

common

feelings

and

create

a

psychological

structures and common mores". The "society" has a "project", "task" or
"end" to be achieved and depends on reason and xvill. Toennies makes a
similar distinction. The community involves a "real and organic life"
xvhile the

society

is

an "imaginary and mechanical structure". "All

intimate, private, and exclusive living together ... is understood
life"

as

in a community, xvhile society is public life. 14 . One is born

into a family and
community.

is bound

to

it

and

this

is

a

reflection

of

Societies are to be kept or formed for given purposes. The

community is old xvhereas the society

is new

as

a name

and

as

a

phenomenon.

Toennies

goes

on

in Part

II

to

claim that the foundation of

'community' is the "natural will" whereas the foundation of
is

'society'

the "rational-will". The "natural will" is an aspect of the "self"

xvhile the "rational xvill" is an aspect of the "person". The
will"

of

a

group

is

composed of understanding, custom, belief, or

faith or creed, concord, mores, religion
will"

in a

group

is

composed

opinion, contracts, regulations
components

reflect

a

"natural

etc., while

of

convention,

and

doctrines.

the

"rational

legislation public
Basically

these

break betxveen the concepts of culture (natural

will) and civilization (rational xvill).
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Toennies was a critic of the organic
recognize

the

theories, although

importance of the continuation of life for human kind.

It is easy to adopt his "natural xvill" and with a
apply

fexv modifications,

it to xvhat I had called the orientation of the human biological

"whole". Feeling, such as
etc.,

he did

are

socially

life, and these
absolutely

no

or

love, liking, anger, kindness, passion,
other

directed and necessary for continuing

come naturally
need

for

to human

beings.

An

amoeba has

such feelings but man, through evolutionary

chance, must adapt himself to a genetic "program" (this concept is not
absolutely

deterministic

but

has

a

meaning

more

akin

to

"preestablished pattern") xvhich includes a biological "xvhole".

Noam

Chomsky

and

his

school

of linguistic analysis feels that

there is one basic "form" common to all human languages. This form, he
believes, must be considered innate and part of the definition of
species.

the

Linguistic capability, then, is due, not only to advances in

culture, but also to man's physical evolution. Other evidence supports
this claim.
basically

Studies have
the

shoxvn that

same manner

and

children

learn

languages

at the same times, without learning

rules nor imitating adults. First they learn xvords then a syntax
is not mere

imitation

"program"

that

of the adults. Tliere seems to be a universal

"program" that is a part of the species. 15. If an
genetic

in

exists

for

language

"programs" for the fundamental categories

evolutionary

and

skills, then xvhy not other
of

cognition

in man

and
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perhaps

for

other

elements

great importance to the

of the human that are less basic but of

relationship

of

the human

and

the human

society.

We cannot think outside the particular patterns
that our brains are conditioned to.... It xvas this
long evolution - not recent history, not the
periods since the Romans or Greeks, for instance
-that
determined
our
basic
physical
and
psychological characteristics. 16.
In any case, cognitive functions need language as an instrument or
they xvould be of little use. The evolutionary and genetic "program" of
mankind is the foundation and the Aristotelian "form" of all cognitive
functions

of

the human, and cannot be hostile to the continuation of

human life.

Nature, hoxvever, has neglected to be specific in its "orientation"
because the "program" in existence has been more
insure

the

continuation

of

human

than

adequate

to

life, and because man is such a

complex creature. Each man and woman is oriented toxvard

a

biological

"whole" yet the parts need not be specific. Despite the attitude that
there is a "right" woman for each man and a "Mr. Right" for each xvoman
and that couples xvere "made for
include

any man

and

each

any xvoman.

former pair may easily be xvith other
seen

as

a

distortion

of

other", the mating

pair

can

The next "mating" of each of the
"mates". Homosexuality

can be

the natural orientation to the biological
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"xvhole". The parts of the
necessarily

bound

"xvhole", then, are

together

by

interchangeable, yet

life and the "life-moment". Although

John Dewey xvould disagree xvith most ofraypaper, he did

indicate

the

"fact" of this communal orientation:

Individuals
xvho are
not
bound together in
associations ... are monstrosities. It is absurd to
suppose that the ties xvhich hold them together are
merely external and do not react into mentality and
character, producing the framexvork of personal
disposition.17.
(The non-rational tenor of

the

paragraph

contradicts

the

rational

undertones to the concept "associations".)

The non-specificity of the "orientation" allows the "orientation"
functions (feelings, etc) to include a larger number of
are

"parts" than

absolutely necessary for a "life-moment" or a biological "whole".

It is for this reason that pictures of children in distress evoke such
a strong response, or that
obtain

our

help. Hoxvever, the

stretched indefinitely.
"all intimate, private
folkways

a proximate human in danger
"orientation

usually will

function" cannot be

Toennies perception that "community" includes
and

exclusive

living

together", "language,

or mores, or beliefs", and "locality" accurately notes the

limitations of the concept and the limitations of the "poxver" of
orientation

to

the

the biological "whole". The importance of "proximity"

and "locality" to the concept of community cannot be

overlooked.

The

116

alienation,

isolation

and

loneliness

of

a person in a large city

results from the barriers that separate the person

from

"community"

and the biological "xvhole". Those barriers are lack of "proximity" and
"locality",

and

the

lack

of a potential biological "xvhole"-- i.e.,

lack of intimacy. The people next door or at xvork etc. lack "humanity"
for her because of the

lack

of

"intimacy",

a

difficult

thing

to

develop.

A

major

part

of

the psychological theories of Carl Gustav Jung

lends itself to the idea of

biological xvholes and mental

For

parts

Jung, man

conscious

part;

uconscious.

It

has

three

the personal
is

to his

psyche:

unconscious

;

the

patterning.

the ego or the
"collective"

the "collective" unconsious that is a peculiarly

Jungian concept and one that

has been

heavily

criticized

by many

psychological theorists. Yet Jung defended his concept throughout his
life

and

there

are

indications of grudging agreement by his former

mentor, Sigmund Freud.

...dreams bring to light material xvhich cannot have
originated either from the dreamer's adult life or
from his forgotten childhoold. We are obliged to
regard it as part of the archaic heritage xvhich a
child brings xvith him into the world^ before any
experience of his oxvn, influenced by the experience
of his ancestors. We find the counterpart of this
phylogenetic material in the earliest human legends
and in survivig customs. Thus dreams constitute a
source of human prehistory xvhich is not to be
despised.18.
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T,

or

Mle both men xvere in agreement that there xvere instincts, drives

innate

tendencies

originated within the
exlored

the

source

that

provided

history

of

the

material

xvhich could not have

particular

individual, Jung

for this material to a far greater degree. Both

men found material or images, symbols etc., in dreams xvhich they had
to

attribute

to a genetic history of experience and Jung called this

the "collective" unconscious.

The collective unconscious...as
the
ancestral
heritage of possibilities of representation, is not
individual but common to all men, and perhaps even
to all animals, and is the true basis of the
indivudual psyche.
This xvhole psyche organism
corresponds exactly to the body....19

While the "collective unconscious" is an ancient psychic heritage, it
oxves nothing

of

its existance to the present individual except as a

carrier or medium.

The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche
which
can be negatively distinguished from a
personal unconscious by the fact that is does not,
like the later, oxve its existence to personal
experience and
cosequently is not a personal
acquisiton. While the personal unconscious is made
up essentially of contents xvhich have at one time
been conscious but xvhich have disappeared from
consciousness, having been forgotten or repressed,
the contents of the collective unconscious have
never been in consciousness, and therefore have
never been individually acquired, but owe their
existence exclusively to heredity. Whereas, the
personal unconscious consists for the most part of
"complexes",
the
content
of
the collective
unconscious
is
made
up
essentially
of
"archetypes".20
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He

adds

a claim that his concept of the archetype is similar to that

of "motifs" of mythological
"representations

research;

collectives"; to

to

Levy-Bruhl's

concept

of

the categories of the imagination

concept of Hubert and Mauss; and the "primordial

thoughts" of Adolf

Bastian.

It

is

the

"collective

unconscious" xvhich is the basis for the

xvhole psyche of the individual. The individual's
personal

unconscious

are

founded

and

formed

oxvn conscious
by

the

and

"collective

unconscious".

...the unconscious, as the
totality
of
all
archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience
right back to its remotest beginnings...a living
system of reactions and aptitudes that determine
the individual's life in invisible ways...From the
living fountain of instinct floxvs everything that
is creative; hence the unconscious is not merely
conditioned by history, but is the very source of
the creative impulse.21

The strength of the foundation and its poxver over the rest of
psyche is not to be dismissed lightly.

We only understood that kind of thinking which is
mere equation, from xvhich nothing comes outbut xvhat
xve have put in.
That is the xvorking of the
intellect.
But besides that, there is a thinking
in primordial images, in symbols which are older
than the historical man, xvhich are inborn in him
fromthe earliest times, and eternally
living,
outlasting all generations, still make up the
ground xvork of the human psyche.
It is only

the
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possible to live the fullest life xvhen xve are in
harmony xvith these symbols; xvisdom is a return to
them.
It is a question neither of belief nor of
knoxvledge, but of the agreement of our thinking
xvith the primordial images of the unconscious.
They are the unthinkable matricies of all our
thoughts, no matter xvhat our conscious mind may
cogitate.22.

The "conscious" or the "ego" is almost dismissed not

as

an

existent

but a substantive existent with its oxvn creative poxver.

...the gifts of reason and critical reflection is
not one of man's outstanding peculiarities, and
even xvhere it exists it proves to be wavering and
inconstant, the more so, as a rule, the bigger the
political groups are. 23
The

collective

unconscious contains the xvhole spiritual heritage

of mankind's evolution, born anexv in
individual.

His

conscious mind

the brain

is

an

structure

ephemeral

of

every

phenomenon that

accomplishes all provisional adaptations and orientations, for xvhich
reason

one can best compare its function to spatial orientation. The

unconscious, on the other hand,
forces

of

the psyche

and

is

the

source

of

the

instinctual

of the forms or categories that regulate

them, namely the achetypes. all the most powerful ideas in history go
back to archetypes. This is particularly true of religious ideas, but
the central
exception

concepts
to

of

this rule.

science, philosophy,

and

ethics

are no

In their present form, they are varients of

archetypal ideas, created by consciously applying and

adapting

these
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ideas to reality.

For it is the function of consciousness not only to

recognize and assimilate the external world through the gateway of the
senses, but to translate into visible reality the xvorld xvithin us. 24

Such strong claims, despite case and mythic
severly

criticised,

almost

holds for Jung's concept
methodology

of

laughed
the

at.

examples, have been

The contempt Philip Rieff

collective

"unconscious" and

his

erupts to the surface on almost every page of the chapter

on Jung's theories in his book, The Triumph of The
Rieff, Jung's

theory

of

the

"collective

Therapeutic.

unconscious"

for

is a seedy

attempt to renexv and revamp antiquated romantic values and ideas, and
to provide

a nexv basis for a religion. However, he does hold Jung's

ideas as a serious challenge and an important concept, though a
one.
and

The
even

true

have his

nature of religion is "a private version of a deeply

unconsciously

paradoxically,

false

from

held

communal

faith"25

and

it

"erupts,

the collective unconscious." The individual may

oxvn religious

images yet

they

are

"merely

varieties" of the collective or communal faith.

The colletive unconscious...is the predicate of
individuation.
Jung's
psychology
of
the
unconscious is not...a version of the pietist
doctrine of the inxvardness of
all
religious
feeling,
irreducibly
personal
and
almost
uncommunicable. On the contrary, the unconscious
is Jung's psychologically functional equivalent of
communities and, in fact, derives its content from
the culture.
It is in the sense of a derivation
from, and individuation of the cultural community,

particular
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that the unconscious is "collective". The notion
is a daring advance on the far older one of an
invisible
church.
It
has yet to be taken
seriously, the less so as the doctrine of the
church has fallen into disuse. The first question
is whether any test can be devised for it - that
is, whether this notion can be used. 26
It

is a notion xvhich Rieff

believes

not

only

to be xvrong, but

untestable, unusable - in fact, to be "the language of faith", yet one
to be considered seriously because of

the

rest

of

its

subtle and

appealing persuasiveness. Jung must speak for himself (and he does so
voluminously).

For

Jung,

then, there is almost a communal nature to man, i.e.,

the individual was born a community and not an individual.
theory

is not

closed

or

substantively

fixed

in

Yet, his

the same xvay as

B.F.Skinner's theories are.

A person is first of all an organism, a member of a
species and subspecies, possessing
a
genetic
endoxvment
of
anatomical
and
physiological
characterisics, xvhich are the product of
the
contingencies of survival to xvhich the species has
been exposed in the process of evolution.
The
organism
becomes
a person as it acquires a
repertoire of behavior under the contingencies of
reinforcement to which it is exposed during its
lifetime. The behavior it exhibits at any moment
is under control of a current setting.... A person
is not an originating agent; he is a locus, a point
at xvhich many genetic and environmental conditions
come together in a joint effect.27.
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Jung recognizes the reductionist arguement in such a position

of

Skinner's and refused to be trapped by it. The ego is an existent and
it

and the personal unconscious must be in balance or in harmony xvith

the "collective unconscious" for
submission

to

healthy

psyche.

Too

great

conscious

"Directedness is absolutely

process" yet

this

"directed"

necessary

aspect

hinders

for
the

unconscious tendencies from creeping into the conscious, producing
onesidedness

a

the collective unconscious is as harmful as repression

of or opposition to it.
the

a

that

is unhealthy.28.

The

balance

itself

a

varies

according to the type of personality or "attitude" types, xvhich are
the

"introvert" and the "extravert".

The introvert tends more to the

rational or conscious, xvhile the extravert submits to a greater degree
to the collective unconscious aspects of
overlapping

of

of

"feeling"

the psyche).

(the
The

polar

opposites

he

do much

of

the mental

and

the

complete

on the scale betxveen thinking and feeling (i.e., does

contemplation, or

emotionally).29.

is an

individual personality then can be

placed on the scale betxveen the complete introvert
extravert, and

There

polar opposites: the "introvert" and the "extravert";

and "thinking" and
processes

his psyche.

does

he

react

instinctively

Extremes on both scales must be considered:

... the individual ego ... is
that continous
centre of consciousness xvhose presence has made
itself felt since the days of childhood. It is
confronted xvith a psyche product that oxves its
existence mainly to an unconscious process and is
therefore in some degree opposed to the ego and its

and
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tendencies. This standpoint is essential in coming
to terms xvith the unconscious. The position of the
ego must be maintained as being of equal value to
the counter-position of the unconscious, and vice
versa. This ammounts to a very necessary xvarning:
for just as the conscious mind of civilized man has
a restrictive effect on the unconscious, so the
rediscovered unconcious
often
has
a
really
dangerous effect on the ego.30.

Jung's

theory,

then,

in brief, is that each human being has txvo

major pshycic sources: the
based

individual's

conscious

and unconscious,

on his own individual experience or history; and the collective

unconscious based on an inherited
created

by

, genetic, or

innate

the common experiences of all human life history, or even

all animate life history.
soul, commonly

shared

The latter is almost

by

every

a

genetic

the

unconscious

conscious sloxvly and tentatively emerge. The personality of

the individual
emotions

Avoerrist

human individual. The "collective

unconscious" is a genetic matrix from which the personal
and

tendencies

reflects

to xvhat degree

the

individual

uses his

or his reason to deal xvith the xvorld, and to what degree the

individual identifies with the "collective unconscious" or the "ego".
A

healthy psyche is one xvhere there is a balance betxveen the personal

and collective parts
extraverted

of

the psyche, betxveen

the

introverted

attitudes, betxveen emotion or feeling, and reason. That

this is a severely skeletal sketch of Jung's theory, and
only

a

small

understood.

and

that

it

is

part of the marvelous work of a great thinker, must be

I cannot hope to present an adequate description

of his
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thories here.

Jung

did

not eliminate the purposive, intentional, creative man,

for these are the concepts he himself applies to the conscious, but he
did place severe restrictions on those aspects.

No matter hoxv beautiful and perfect man may believe
his reason to be, he can alxvays be certain that it
is only one of the possible mental functions, and
covers only that one side of the phenomenal xvorld
xvhich corresponds to it. But the irrational, that
xvhich is not agreeable to reason, rings it about on
all sides. And the irrational is likexvise a
psychological function - in a word, it is the
collective unconscious; xvhereas the rational is
essentially tied to the conscious mind.31.
The

collective unconscious not only is the matrix, the foundation

for the human psyche, not only surrounds
psyche, but

impregnates

the xvhole

it almost totally dominates the young child, and resists

the eruption of
sporadic

and

a personal

consciousness,

conscious.

"limited

to

At

first, the

the perception

connections betxveen two or more psychic contents", and
continuous memory.

child

has

of

a fexv

there

is no

Tliese "islands of memory" are the first stirrings

of the ego.

Only later, xvhen the ego-contents - the so-called
ego-complex - have acquired an energy of their oxvn
(very likely as a result of training and practice)
does the feeling of subjectivity or 'I-ness' arise.
This may well be the moment xvhere the child begins
to speak of itself in the first person.
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Still the child is dependent on his parents.
Psychic birth,
and
xvith
it
the
conscious
differentiation from the parents, normally takes
place only at puberty, xvith the eruption
of
sexuality. The physiological change is attended by
a psychic revolution....
Until this period is
reached the psychic life of the individual is
governed
largely by instinct, and fexv or no
problems arise.32.

The xvorld of the collective unconscious contains primordial images
or "archetypes" which "are the most ancient
'thought-forms' of

humanity",

and

they

and

the most

universal

are "as much feelings as

thoughts".33. The source of these archetypes are the "deposits of the
constantly repeated experiences of humanity."34. The contents of

the

personal unconscious are "memory-images" personally experienced by the
individual, xvhereas
personally
symbolism

the

experienced

archetypes

but

are

or

genetic

primordial

images

are not

The

common

givens.35.

of the myths and legends, and of dreams, attest to a common

viexv of experience and to the collective psyche.

Ernst Cassirer, and
collective

images

or

his

followers, have

also

discovered

symbols concept in the myths and legends. For

Cassirer, man is a symbol maker, and it is this unusual activity
is

the

basis

for man's

ability to conceptualize.

universe.

that

"Man lives in a

symbolic universe". "Language, myth, art, and religion are
this

the

parts

of

They are the varied threads xvhich xveave the symbolic

net, the tangled xveb of human experience".36. Man is to

be

defined,
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not

as

animal

rationale

but

as animal symbolicum.

There are some

medical incidents to back up such a concept. Aphasia victims

usually

can perform many menial or everyday tasks, but have great difficulty
in conceptualizing.

Myth and mythical symbols are also very
philosophy.

For

in Cassirer's

him, myth is "an instrument of the great process of

spiritual differentiation through which
social

important

basic

determinate

forms

of

and individual consciousness arise from the chaos of the first

indeterminate life feeling."37. This process accomplishes txvo things
which

are not

sense

of

inseparable but are stages in the same development: a

community

and

individuality.

The

mythical-religious

consciousness is the foundation for all society.

The very existence and form of human society itself
requires such a foundation; for even xvhere xve
suppose that we have society before us in its
empirically earliest and most primitive form, it is
not
something
originally given but something
spiritually conditioned and mediated.
All social
existence is rooted in concrete forms of community
and the feeling of community.
And the more xve
succeed in laying bare this root, the more evident
it becomes that the primary feeling of community
never stops at the dividing lines which xve posit in
our highly developed biological class concepts but
goes beyond them toxvard the totality of living
things.
Long before man had knoxvledge of himself
as a separate species distinguished
by
some
specific poxver and singled out from nature as a
xvhole by a life as a whole, xvithin xvhich each
individual
creature
and
thing
is magically
connected xvith the xvhole, so that a continuous
transition, a meta morphosis of one being in
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another, appears not only as possible but as
necessary, as the "natural" form of life itself.
38.
It is a remarkably similar description to that of Jung, yet
different

in a

field of study, and from a different viexvpoint. It is even

more remarkable when Cassirer speaks of

totems

and

other

religious

symbols, xvhich are "embedded in a universal mythical view",39 in many
xvays in the same manner and representing the same concepts
archetypes.

I do not

intend

to

claim

that

as Jung's

Jung's theories and

Cassirer's theories are identical, merely that, in many xvays, their
description

of the human in culture is remarkably similar. For Jung,

the collective is in the unconscious, for Cassirer, the community is a
condition for society and is grounded in the consciousness - in fact,
it

seems

to be

a

category of consciousness, i.e., the "feeling of

community".

P.F.Strawson, in his book Individuals, does not describe the human
in the same manner as Jung, and I believe he would abhor

the

linking

of his logic to Jung's theories. Hoxvever, his brilliant essay on the
"individual" did present the concept of
him,

the mind

and

the primitive person.

For

body were not entities but attributes of another

entity "the person".

What I mean be the concept of a person is the
concept
of a type of entity such that both
predicates ascribing states of consciousness and
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predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a
physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to
a single individual of that single type. 40.
For him, the person is logically prior to and is
foundation

the

ontological

of, consciousness and the character of the body.41. It is

partly by this priority that he means "primitive", and, partly,

that

as such, the "primitive person" falls outside the achievement or grasp
of

the

consciousness.

unconscious itself cannot
because

it

too

Jung

too

believes

be perceived

is prior

to

and

that

directly

the

the

be

foundation

the

collective
conscious

of the personal

conscious. An extension of the concept of the "primitive person" can
be made

to

suit

the

requirements of the concept of the "primitive

human unit", which xvould be a biological whole, a "community" oriented
toward the whole through the collective unconscious.
are many
not go

Hoxvever, there

differences between the thought of the two men xvhich I will

into here.

philosophers

By

as Cassirer

introducing
and

the

thought

of

Straxvson, I xvish to

such

diverse

indicate that

concepts of other thinkers do indicate a similarity in attitude to the
problem of the human.

I had indicated that a "biological whole" or
require

a

genetic

patterning

or

"life-moment" xvould

orientation xvithin each male and

female. Chomsky believes that a type of patterning xvas indicated
the

development

of

language

skills

by

in children, by a fundamental

10Q

^ 1 , " > °'M"'> pr-n.hT<™«- o-c W C r e C:nc q u

has
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Tlie brain

genetic paradigms, something akin to Kant's categories, and it is

nigh to impossible to think beyond those limits. Jacques Monod agrees
xvith Chomsky's conclusions but from the more scientific viexvpoint of a
genetic researcher. Jung presents a more complete concept of
patterning, xvith support, small
ps,c

-~;~1, .>—, Sigmund Freud.

collective

aspect

consciousness, for
Straxvson presents
individual.
logically

in

it be, fro:.i „»„ ^a

Cassirer,

too, has

never

speaks

"primitive

of

the

viexv of

unconscious

a

at all.

person" but applies it only to the

I suggested that Straxvson's concept

to

a

„

the human psyche or, as he calls it, the human

he
a

though

genetic

could

be

developed

incorporate the community as an aspect of the primitive

person.

The patterning of the "biological xvhole" xvould have
the

collective

unconscious, xvere the

dominate

idea of a "life-moment" or a

"life-process" to survive as it has historically.
archetypes of the mother and the father.

to

Jung does introduce

In fact, at

suggests just such a genetic patterning.

Tliere is no human experience, nor xvould experience
be possible at all, xvithout the intervention of a
subjective
aptitude. What is this subjective
aptitude? Ultimately it consists in an innate
psychic
structure
which
alloxvs man to have
experiences of this kind. Thus the x/hole nature of

one point

he
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man presupposes xvoman, both
psychically
and
spiritually.
His system is tuned in to xvoman from
the start, just as it is prepared for a quite
definite xvorld where there is water, light, air,
salt, carbohydrates, etc. The form of the world
into which he is born is already inborn in him as a
virtual image.
Likewise parents, xvife, children,
birth and death are inborn in him as virtual
images, as psychic aptitudes.
These a priori
categories have by nature a collective character;
they are images of parents, xvife, and children in
general, and are not individual predestinations.
42.

In

other xs'ords, we

have

a collective predisposition, a collective

psyche with unconscious content xvhich are not the memory images of the
conscious (although he does not rule out collective memory images) but
which need individual experience to give it shape, to give it life for
the conscious.

The rational or conscious foundation for xvhat is normally
relations betxveen

individuals

has not

been

examined

considering the concept of human biological xvhole, such
is

unnecessary

for

establishing

a

community.

It

a

called

as yet but,
foundation
is communal

attributes of the human that are the foundation of the community.

The

"orientation" or the partial nature of

the

community

individual

or the collective as its foundation.

is that "orientation"
"process

the

of

required

by

the

presumes

The collective psyche

genetic

requisites

of

the

life". Feelings, emotions, instincts, drives, etc., are

the functional or

activating

aspects

of

the

orientation

and

the
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archetypes

are the substance of that orientation.

"real and organic
supposed.

The

life" to
individual

a

greater

degree

The community is a

than

Toennies

is a creature of the community:

had

for the

original community, the "biological xvhole" is prior in principle
in

fact

to

the

individual

diverged itself. Should an
affects

only

the

size

content, make-up, form,
community.
that.

parts

into xvhich

individual

of

the

die, its

community

structure

or

any

it has functionally
absence

and not
other

and

or

death

the substance,

attribute

of

the

The community is in each human psyche but it is more than

Not only is it in each human psyche but it must be the communal

female oriented to the biological xvhole, the communal male oriented to
the biological whole, the child oriented to the biological xvhole, the
parent

oriented

to the biological etc. To examine the psyche of one

individual is to examine only a part of the community,
can never grasp the "wholeness" of
individuals,

it

the

community.

the individual
Were

there no

is true there would be no community. Where there is

no community, hoxvever, there would be no individual for the process of
life ceases. Were half
substance

of

the

number

of

individuals

eliminated

the

the community xvould not be affected. Were a functional

part of the community eliminated i.e. eliminate xvomen, men, parents,
or

children, then the community xvould be damaged if not destroyed and

xvith it the individuals, over historic duration, xvould be

destroyed.

If no children survived, or there xvere no females, then the adults, or
the males, xvould

live

out

their

lives probably

suffering

from
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alienation or anomie, and then mankind xvould cease to exist.

In every

biological sense man is a community of xvhich the " individual"

is an

intrinsic and a functional part or attribute.

Because

of

the

"community", a

biological-organic

definition

of

foundation of the concept of

"community" xvith rational

overtones

misses the mark. Toivo Miljan xvrote:
The concept of community may be defined as the
sharing of some values, beliefs, and interests to a
greater or lesser" degree]
Ethnic community and"
political community may both" Be defined as the
sharing of some valuesTpeliefs and" interests and
founding myths iiid future Utopias, to a greater or
lesser degree. The difference between ethnic and"
political
community
is the addition of such
specific political values as resourse allocation,
resource
arbitration and legitimacy. (Emphasis
his.)43.

Later on he

alloxvs that

"ethnic

and

political

community

are

undifferentiated and organic in both conceptualization and operation",
but

he misses

the point that man is community by definition and by

nature. Man does not "share" in a community, for "share" has

rational

and voluntary values to its meaning xvhile community is a basic organic
"need" "orientation" and is not voluntary. Similarly, "founding myths
and future Utopias" have their roots in the "rational" and not in the
organic. "Interests", too, has, in
"involvement"
rational

or

"concern"

overtones.

this

in "something"

context, a meaning
and

that meaning

of
has

"Resource allocation, and resource arbitration"
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are obviously rational projects and are part of society
contracts, agreements

dealing xvith

etc. The almost total confusion of "rational"

and "non-rational", "organic"and "contrived" does little

to

help

us

understand xvhat a "community" is, whether ethnic or political.

To

recapitulate, life,

its maintenance and its continuation are

the primary projects for all animated creatures. All biological units
must

reflect

or

include

"life-moments". An

amoeba

those
is

three

functions

and

continuation

of

of

accomplishing

life within its oxvn structure. A man or a xvoman

cannot be called a "life-moment" unit because neither he
capable

of

structure.

accomplishing

the

continuation

of

nor

she

Each man and each xvoman, therefore, cannot be considered a

"xvhole" must

consist

of

continue, the

a mating man and xvoman and txvo

(male and female) children (because of the absolute dependence of
infant

is

life xvithin its oxvn

biological unit or "xvhole". In order for human life to
biological

called

a "life-moment" unit because it is a

"life transmitter", and because it is fully capable
the

are

human.) As

"independence" as

a

result, the

definitions

or

concepts

parts

of

a

of

the

"separation" and

definition must

be

abandoned or given a nexv meaning.

Jacques Maritain and Ferdinand Toennies suggest that the concepts
of

"community"

foundations.

and

"society"

have

txvo different

meanings

and

The former has its roots in the biological nature of man
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and is

a more

"natural" entity, xvhile society

rational, mechanical

a more

and artificial nature. Dealing xvith the concept

of the "community", I have claimed an even
than

reflects

stronger

biological

base

either Maritain or Toennies could accept. The biological "xvhole"

orientation in each man
Additionally,

the

and

xvoman

orientation

is

a

community

by

definition.

requires or includes "other" directed

feelings and behaviour. Consequently,

each man

and

each xvoman is

"programmed" genetically, as a result of the chance and necessities of
evolutionary

development,

to have

communal

and social attributes.

Language is an example where its acquisition is a result of
or

a

social

communal "program". There is reason to assume that all fundamental

cognitive functions are genetically "programmed". The only conclusion,
that I can accept so far is that the "individual" is
that mankind

can

only

a phantom

be divided into "life-moments" which are the

final indivisible biological unit or "xvhole". Each man and
parts

of

and

xvoman are

a xvhole and that to be considered otherxvise xvould deny the

fundamental importance of "life" in all animate creatures.

The "individual" that we

are

accustumed

to

conceptualize

has

failed to materialize. In fact, the true biological human "individual"
is, by

nature, already a community. "Separation" "independence" and

"completeness" are completely lacking in the human
consider

the

biological

"part"

"life-moment." To

(male or female) as an "individual"

existent is almost comparable to considering the detached

arm

as

an
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"individual"

existent,

i.e.,

having life of its ovm.

has an anatomical attachment to the body, the male
"living"

functional

attachment

to

the

or

While the arm
female

biological

"Separateness", "independence", and "completeness" cannot be
to

the

male

or

female

except

in

a purely

relationship. "Autonomy", hoxvever, has not
that

been

has

a

xvhole.
attached

inanimate

spatial

eliminated

because

xvhich is purely biological is not "self-governing." "Autonomy"

does not

concern

itself

with

"community"

for

rule-making

is an

activity of "society".

A

viexv of the basic unit of human kind xvhich includes the concept

of the "life-moment" or the
"community"

biological

is an a priori fact.

xvhole, xvould

indicate

that

It would give a nexv emphesis to the

xvords of Bishop Butler xvhen he xvrote:

That mankind is a community, that we all stand in a
relation to each other, that there is a public end
and interest of society which each particular is
obliged to promote, is the sum of morals. 44.
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PART 111

no
Iii t.xO last section, xve started with i basic biologica1 principle:
tae reproduction continuance and maintenance of the 1 i c e
pjrticipait

of

process.

A

'ifc process is the funlamental biological unit,

the

i.e. tie instrumeit through xvhich the reproduction of T i fe continues.
This

"aiological" x/nole consisted of the mating pair and c^^dren 4 n

the family. Any one part, the female, the male

or

the

cVld,

is

unable to repro luce life xvithout the other parts working together as a
x/hole.

In

order

for

the

"biological

unit" to exist a genetic or

i'merited "orientation" toxvard the xvhole" must exist in each an I every
individual.

In fact, the individual cannot exist properly xvithout the

"whole" because

of

hoxvever, does

not

this

genetic

orientation.

The

"orientation",

have a fixed content, i.e., the individual is not

genetically "oriented" toward one mate or even any tyoe of mate, nor
is tiie individual "oriented" necessarily to only one mate, nor to more
that one mate.

Such decisions are the result of cultural and personal

experiences.

Carl

Jung

introduced

a

fundamental parts or layers:
unconscious
ignited,

and

the

created,

individual.

The

inheritance

from

oat

collective

psyche

containing

tT">rce major,

the collective unconscious, the personal

conscious.

Tilled

the

human

or

The

latter

aroused

two

categories xvere

by the experience o^ the

unconscious, however, vas

a

genetic

genetic experiences of the deve^ornent o r life

ai'l of the human species,

its contents xvere called

"archetypes" and
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were

descriped

as primodia!

shared by every human being.
everyone

shared

in

it

images, even primordial memory images

It was a community

unconscious

through their genetic being.

unconscious was the foundation, the matrix for the
and

it

formed

ana

permeated

because

Tie collective

"personal" psyche

both the personal unconscious and the

conscious.

A biological requirement for a "biological x/hole" that was not the
individual had been discovered, and the organic

instrument

by

w^ch

this "whole" existed as a being is to be discovered in the "collective
unconscious".

The human unit is community in its being.

It cannot be

otherwise

or the xvhole liCe process xvould have been disrupted and man

xvouLd have

ceased to exist. Definitions describing the individual as

"separate", as a "unit", as "distinct" or as "complete" tail
any meaning

in

to have

the organic theory of the community described above.

The human as community is logically, onto'ogically,

and

historically

prior to the individual.

In

this

section,

I xrant to

erect the societal ediface on the

foundations of the community just described.
Toennies

Society,

according

and Maritain, is more closely rooted in the rational nature

of man rather than in the biological or organic nature OL man.
I

have

to

While

explored, in a superficial manner, the coMective unconscious

and its contents an 1 purpose,

I have

not

described

the personal
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unconscious

nor

the conscious and their contents.

It is in at least

one of the two layers that society must be rooted, and it is in these
txvo sections that the concept of "autonomy" must find its meaning.

In his book Man and the State, Maritain states:
A

society always gives rise to communities and community Peelings

within and around itself. Never can a
society,

though

it can

societal

organization

be

the

springs

community

natural

up

(levelop jjrto a

soil

through

from which some

reason.

f Emphasis

mine)l.
At
A

first

glance, this claim of Maritain's seemed to be common sense.

society, being

strength",

an

sets

artifice, a

up

a

"product

mechanical

of

reason

framework

constitution, rules, etc.) xvhich requires voluntary
behaviour

of

rooted

in

non-rational

(e.g. contract,
modifications

of

the participcnts. Over tine, these modifications become

"second nature" and
"community"

and moral

become

oriented
the

function. On

biological

nature

habits

to

or

of

the

"natural

create

group

behaviour

- a more

other hanl, a "community",
xvill", is barred

by

its

something that xvas not "natural" but

mechanical.

Hoxvever, there
"society".

The

are

Elks

problems

club

or

xvith Mari tain's
the

Shrincrs

conception

oc

are a "society" or an

association, i.e., the members voluntarily have participate-1. Yet, an
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examination

of

the members

similarities, e.g.,

x;il] unearth

Iciguage,

social

cu'tural

and

communa1

strata, education, religion,

Locality, values, beliefs, etc. T/hy should

anyone associate xvith

another for some time unless they had something in common? More
simple

expediency

or a contract attracts a person to the Elks. There

must be a communal attraction
association

like

the

before

the

actual

there

is

a "society"

and

feelings

of

axve are

serves

an

communal

structure and theology arc societal functions,

i.e., arc rooted in the "rational xvill". Hoxvever, the
institution

or

Shriners. Tie same holds true cor a re1igious

institution. Whereas the belief
functions

than

structure

or

as a medium to satisfy the expression of communal

functions, and theology is a

rational

explanation

of

the

communal

expression and functions.

The

state, as Toennies claims, can be considered

a "society" or

at least a functional part of society. Much of the machinery
being

bureaucratic)

''despite

is rooted in the "rational will". A constitution

is as much a product of the "rational xvill" as any other creation of a
group of people, yet it is limited and formed by the
the

community. When

Prime Minister of Canada stated pubHcally that "Free enterprise"

economy no longer existed in Canada, the
forced

him

resulting

horrified

outcry

to retract his remarks. It didn't matter t\nt his remarks

x:ere accurate, he had "attacked" a belief that /as sacrosanct for
general

puolic.

The

the

same feelings ^in^ beliefs are involved in other
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concepts

such

constitution

as

"democracy"

refLects

and

"representation"

etc.

Tie

the values, feelings anl beliefs of the people

to whom it xvill apply. In fact,

fas

in

the

community

or

communities. A constitution cannot be set up unless the

community

is

U.S.S.R.)

unless

it

allows

it
for

is a
and

useless

includes

document

prior to its construction.

The

community must

be

prior to the "state" as well. Barrington

Moore, Jr., claims that the type of "state" and political
determined

by

the

type

onto

a

past.2.

culture

To

xvithout

graft
the

society or the cultural roots necessary
impossible

a

democratic

fo^m

of

traditions of a democratic

for

such

a

society

is an

task. It matters little x/hether or not the constitution or

type of government is "right", any such attempt will fai1 because
"basic"

is

of political culture developed in the oast,

i.e. in a pre-industrial
government

culture

the

community for such a society does not exist. No "society" is

possible xvithout a prior community.

For hundreds of years, Western philosophers and sociologists
been

trying

to

"fit"

the

txvo concepts

"society" together. Hans Saner
Thought,

by

begins

his

of

the

have

"individual" anl

book, Kant's

Political

stating "Politics is based on reason. It begins with the

use of reason, not xvith the political act." For such a broad claim
be

true, the

"fact" of

"community"

could

not

be

prior

to

to the
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"individual" or to society. Kant's "autonomous'' being or reason xvoiikl
require

a

"society" or "contract" in order to live as social beings.

Saner's interpretation of
contract

theory

Kant's

thought

results

in

the

ultimate

- a theory long since discarded as an inadequate (if

not inaccurate) explanation for the origin of society.3.

Xarl Mannheim, in his book Essays on
states:

"the

individual

is

the

Sociology

of Culture,

the seat of reality and the reality of

groups is derivative", yet, that "the group approach to the individual
is more effective than the direct"4. and that the principal thesis
"tnat mental

is

processes have a social dimension."5. Tie first part of

his book is devoted xvholly to the relational problem o f the individual
and society, yet arrives at a conclusion xvhich, in my

view, merely

biurrs the boundaries of each concept. Society is formed by the "vital
autonomy, or living self-hood of the individuals as social units".

Often, the problem of origin and nature of "society" is "answered"
in

the

very

questions

the

author poses. J.T.J. Srzednicki makes a

number of assumptions in his question:
... I begin by searching for the basic, groundfloor
the

field,

questions

in

e.g. "What is the nature of communal co-operation?" -

it then becomes quite clear that xvhat one is asking
natural nane in English, i.e. "co-operation"

6.

about

has

a
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Such an analysis leads him to the "natural" conclusion:
... the communal bond typica;Ly leaves the individuals as separate
as

ever, they

Second"1 y} the

are independent though related....

relations must have a point ail/or be desirable from the point
vie,; of
then

the

and

forming the community in question, ror

individuals

only

then

is

of

there

any

real

oc

possibility

the

arrangement working in its oxvn right.7.
The question

already

assimes

"distinct

willed relationship", and the ansxver to the
proves

the

existence

of

individuals
question

in a mutually
then

shows or

"listinct individuals in a mutually xrlied

relationship."

Pitirim A. Sorokin v/as much more
society.

In his

book:

Contemporary

judicious

in his

Sociological

analysis

or

Tieories, S he

classifies the various views of the nature of society. At one extreme,
there is the "nominalistic or atomistic" conception in xvhich society
is nothing

but

individuals.

Next is the "functional" viexv in which

society is the system of interrelated
has no

reality

beyond

from tiie reality of

the

individuals. Although

society

the individual members, society is different
same

inlividuals

isolated.

At

the

other

extreme, there is the "mechanistic" view in xvhich society is like some
kind

or a machine system, and the "organic" viexv in x/hich society has

a ' iving unity and a reality beyond, its individual members. Locke and
Rousseau

had

"atomistic

vlex/s" of society, Karl Mannheim (and, some
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claim, St. Thomas) had a "functional" view, and Jose Antonio Prime de
Rivera

had

systems

an

"organic"

theories

variation

of

as

this

view.

It is possible to label some of the

"mechanical," and,

certainly,

Comte

held

a

viexv. Sorokin goes on to claim that the "organic"

view was tiie most popular view amongst sociologists at that time.

In the last section ("community"), I tried to demonstrate

that man,

viewed as a "life-form," is not individual but communal by definition.
An "Atomistic" viexv of society wouM fail to account for the "communal
man." Others, however, (xvith the notable exception of John Rawis) also
declare

the "Atomistic" viexv as an inadequate explanation or theory.

The "functional" view of the interrelated individuals allows each maJe
or female to be an individual unit
propensities

of

their

although

related

by

the

social

nature. Again, this view fails to account for

man as a "life-form", as a communal biological "xvhole". Tie family

is

an organic "life-form". Comte comes close to this viexv xvhen ho states:
"domestic

relations do not constitute an association, but a union, in

the full force of the term; and, on account of
the

domestic

connection

is

close

intimacy,

a totally different nature from the

social."9. He goes on

to

dependent

special development of intellectual influences"

upon

"the

add

of

this

that

society

is a

social

organism

i.e. enlightened reason. However, in society, some individuals are, by
nature, superior in reason and can command others to submit
Society,

to

them.

then is hierarchical and authoritarian, due to the "natures"
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of the people xvithin

it.

sympathetic

in the reader, iv^o feels instinctively that his

response

Comte's

"mechanistic" view fails to include

a

"society"

sense

of

fails

to

evoke

a

responsibility, or

change etc.

The "organic" viexv has a basic principle that the social existance
is primary and the individual being is secondary. It views society as
a unity or as a body of xvhich the parts are members.
entity

independent

of

any

one

individual

or

Society

is an

the mere sum of the

individuals.

Spain is NOT a territory. NEITHER is it
an
aggregate of men and xvomen. Spain is, above all,
AN INDIVISIBLE DBSfINY. A historical reality. An
entity, real in itself, xvhich has accomplished And xvill yet accomplish in future - missions of
universal importance.
Tierefore, Spain exists:
1. As something APART from each individual and
from the classes and groups xvhich constitute it.
2.
As something SUPERIOR to each
of
these
individuals, classes and grouns and even to their
sim total.10.

Usually one thinks of a
"society"

and

bifurcation

of

the

human

into

two pa*~ts

"individual". Hoxvever, for Marx, the individual xvas a

port of a "class". Others substitute "the family" for the

individual.

Heinrich Von Treitschke did not speak of the "individual" or "society"
at all:
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The State is tiie peop^ legacy united as an independent power. By
"people"

xve understand,

briefly,

a plural

number of families

permanently living together. When this is recognized, it
that

the

State

dates

that it has existed

as

follows,

from the very beginning and is necessarv,
long

as

history

and

is

essential

to

humanity as language.... 11.
"Article Forty One" of the Irish Constitution (1937), states:
Tie

State

recognizes

the

Family

fundamental unit group of society,
possessing

as
and

the natural

primary and

as

institution

a moral

inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and

superior to all positive laxv.
to protect

the

Tie State, therefore, guarantees

Family in its constitution and authority, as the

necessary basis of

social

order

and

as

indispensable

to

the

welfare of the Nation and the State.12.
In

each

case, hoxvever, the

individual

greater or superior than himself. In the

last

iras oart of an entity
section,

I

indicated

that the male or female xvas but a part of something greater (i.e., the
biological

"xvhole") and

that

the

biological orientation and basic

categories of cognition are programmed by the
wholly

biological

in nature. Ancient

genetic

code

China, as was

and

are

ixrnted out

earlier, attached so much importance to the family that no ch;id coulr1
move out of the family home until both parents x/ere dead. Other severe
social and
dcsce.idents

legal

restrictions

xvere

impose! on

the

child-en

and

in order to support the family. An extended family couif1
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contain numerous generations
known

to

build

whole

and

Romans

Tribesmen

have

been

social systems on the principle nc "biood" or

kinship. Even today Chinese
Patrician

descendents.

names

present

the

r

amily name first.

not only had a family name but a tribal or kin name

as well. Victorian ladies xvere knoxvn to say of a

person

"blood will

tell," meaning that the "qualities" of the family (or other members of
the family) xvill be in the particular person "individual".

Not

only

the biological

community orientation xvas found in the

human, but a psycnical community also could be ascribed to the human.
The

unconscious

behavior or
purpose
the

and

impulse

toxvard

actions

in

unconscious
the

process

involving

that, seemingly,

cnildhood

these

impulses

involve

personal unconscious, these

root in the experience
partial

of mental

a tendency
are xvithout

xvhich do not involve rational or conscious thinking.

collective

archetypes;

consists

of

the

experiences

individual.

For

the

In

inheritel

impulses have their
Freud,

these

( re

xvhich are repressed, and all "psychic

material that lies belo.v the

threshold

contains

fears, feelings, and ideas xvhich are not

xvishes, memories,

of

consciousness."

13.

It

subject to conscious awareness yet continually influence the conscious
processes. We can observe the unconscious at xvork by
behavior

of

the

individuals.

For

observing

instance, a man

may bite his

fingernails, make repetitive gestures xvith his ^ands, foHow the
routine

dressing

in

the mornings, etc.

the

same

More fundamental are the
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reactions xvhen a

cherished

symbol

or

belief

is attacked,

e.

g.

burning the flag.

C. H.

Cooley

xvas instrumental in creating sociology as a viable

field of study in tie United States. His theories are seldom
today

despite

of the

his influence on sociological thought at the beginning

twentieth

explanation

for

century.
his

I

neglect

suspect

that

a

good

part

of

the

is the strong organic theory he holds.

For him tliere is no distinction betxveen
because

studied

the

individual

and

society

"the mind is social, and society is mental." Tie individual

not only has a biological or genetic inheritance

but

inheritance.

"stream of life" the

Tae

social

inheritance

is

the

also

a

social

absorption of xvhich alloxvs the individual to have all those attributes
that are identified as human. Cooley talks of
similar

to

distinction

that

of

betxveen

Toennies'
society

society

in a manner

community and fails to make a

and

culture.

Society

clear

provides

the

institutions, the family, the clan, etc; the tools such as language or
communications;

the

ideas, values

and mores. For him there is no

distinction betxveen the human mind and
prior

to

the

foundation.

individual

society yet

mind, moulds

it, and

Cooley's theories, then, are an

the personal

psyche

and

its

psyche

society

is

provides for it a

organic

description

of

contents. In principle, his theories

indicate that the personal unconscious is the
human

the

adaptive

part

of

the

allowing the individual to absorb the culture about him
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so that he becomes an integral part of the group to which he belongs.
It also alloxvs him to fill out those human

attributes

or

tendencies

xvhich he has genetically inherited, and he "becomes" human as opposed
to the children supposedly brought up by xvolves etc. xvho never
human

but

remain an animal.

It alloxvs the inherited tendency toxvard

the "self" and "self- Axvareness" to
unconscious

adapts

the

individual

find
and

substance.
his

tendencies and attributes to a loved xvorld, to
could

almost

say

Tie personal

inherited

instincts,

a human xvorld.

One

that the personal unconscious mediates betxveen the

collective unconscious

and

Although

would

Erich

become

Fromm

the

collective

or

social

inheritance.

appose the theories of C. H. Cooley and

Jung, he nevertheless, expressed nicely what

I believe

to

be

the

function of the personal unconscious.

Man's nature, his passions and anxieties are a
cultural product; as a matter of fact, man himself
is the most important creation and achievement of
the continuous human effort, the record of xvhich xve
call history. 14.
Lord Cecil held a viexv less organically oriented
yet

he

the

environment

Cooley's,

claimed that "the mind itself is largely formed and guided by

civilization

of

civilization."

15.

akin to that of culture).

For him there xvere txvo major principles:
that

than

society

is mental."

16.

(Having

a

concept

of

Cooley*s claims are stronger.
"the mind

He believed

is

social, and

that "both persons and
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groups are organic wholes that move ahead by a tentative
and

that

entity.

process" 17

what xve usually associate as the individual is a fictitious

The individual mind is a functional part of a xvhole.

Tie viexv that all minds act together in a vital
whole from xvhich the individual is never really
separate floxvs naturally from our groxving knoxvledge
of heredity and suggestion,
xvhich makes
it
increasinly clear that every thought we have is
linked xvith the thought of our ancestors and
associates, and through them with that of society
at large. 18.
To thinlc of the individual mind even
impossible.
integral

Tie individual mind is

part

of

the

as

an

abstracted

concept

is

so tied to the social, so much an

social that any examination of the individual

must take place in the group.

The individual

does

not

exist

apart

from the social.

...human
nature
is
not
something
existing
separately in the individual, but a group-nature or
primary phase of society, a relatively simple and
general condition of the social mind
Man does
not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it accept
through fellowship, and it decays in isolation. 19.
...the individual has his being only as part of a
xvhole. What does not comes by communication and
intercourse; and the more closely xve look the more
apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of
the eye and community the inner truth. 20.

Tie

two major

principles

by xvhich an individual is created are

lieredity and communication. What a man does not have by

heredity lie
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has

from

society through communication.

It is society and heredity

xvhich give to him everything that is human.
xvhole and
21.

Society

is

the vital

society "may be as original or creative as anything else."

The creative individual is as much a part of the "general

of life" as any other individual for

creativity

is

also

stream

social

in

origin.

Innovation is just as social as conformity, genius
as mediocrity. These distinctions are not betxveen
what is individual and xvhat is social, but betxveen
xvhat is usual or
established
and
xvhat
is
exceptional or novel. 22.
The

individual has no separate existence. He is bound into the xvhole

of xvhich he is a member by both heredity and the social factors in his
life.
social

Even his heredity in many respects
history

is

social

as

it has "a

in that it has had to adapt itself to past society in

order to survive" i.e. they have had to undergo "a social test in the
lives of our ancestors." 23. "Even physical influences, like food and
climate, rarely

reach

us

except

as modified and adapted by social

conditions." 24. The society is prior
ontically

to

the mind

xvithout reference to the

of

the

historically,

logically

individual yet cannot be thought of

sum of all human life. Without society, the

individual could live the life of an intelligent animal but his
faculties xvould be lost.

and

human
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It

is

difficult

to

understand

Cooley's conception of man. He

considers human life to be a social and inherited process
of

life".

end

and

proximity.

"stream

Were xve to think of a rope xve find that strands are xvoven

or braided into continuous lengths.
an

or

is not

Each strand has a

beginning

and

physically connected to other strands except in

Each strand is virtually useless, having no

strength, no

purpose, no substantive identity on its oxvn. Each strand carries the
same limitations into the rope as it is xvoven yet the
unit

is

created.

It has strength greater than the sum of the parts.

It has a purpose or use which it bestows
frayed

rope).

It

is also

of

the

on

the parts

(xve discard

continuous yet to consider it apart from

the component strands is impossible.
continuity

real xvhole or

rope, it

Each

strand

is

lost

in the

gains strength from the continuity, it

gains its purpose and value from that continuity.

...life is a creative process,...we are really
building
up
something
new and xvorth xvhile,
and...the human xvill is a part of the creative
energy that does this. Every individual has his
unique share in the xvork, xvhich NO ONE but himself
can discern and perform. Although his life flows
into him from the hereditary and social past, his
being as a xvhole is nexv, a fresh organization of
life. 25.
The nexv, "fresh organization of life" is a nexv fresh
in

the

individual

mind

of

judgement discerns and performs
performs.

organization

the social life process, yet individual
the

xvork or

role

that

individual

Hoxv is it that Cooley's theory alloxvs for "a nexv being" or
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a "fresh organization of life" and yet is
Cooley's

works

failed

to

so

collectively

give me an answer yet I xvould hazard the

following guess. While the mind of every individual
absorbs

the

culture

absorption does not
tell

a

group

of

the

grasps

The

group around him, such experiences and
Should

similar

colours, the mixtures

xvould not

be

In a more complex manner, the human psyche

hocus-pocus
and

Such a concept does not
Wittgenstein's

the
take

pattern.

The

personal

unconscious

experiences of each child is different.
axvay from

famous

the

collective

aspect

of

analogy of the games is an excellent

one to explain hoxv the txvo concept work xvithin each other. All
have

we

children will not start xvith the same colour or with

experiences

theory.

and

of children to mix paints in a boxvl and each child has

the same amount and so on.
folloxvs a

experiences

occur in a fixed or identical manner.

the same number and amount of
identical.

oriented?

games

a sum of attributes but each game does not have every attribute.

Let us say that the sum of attributes
first

game

is

a

is

as

follows:

ABCDE.

The

game because it has ABC and D; the second game has

ACDE; the third BCDE and so on. Tiey are games because they have
many

of

the

set of attributes.

so

Individuals behave in much the same

manner. No individual has the whole social inheritance

but

he

does

have as many attributes as he can hold.

In order to alloxv the "social mind" to become his, the individual
must inherit aptitudes for the social. Remarkably similar

to Jung's
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concept

of

the

collective

unconscious

orientation", Cooley claims that each

or my

individual

"biological xvhole
inherits

a

social

predisposition.

...the child has by heredity a generous capacity
and need for social feeling, rather too vague and
plastic to be given any specific name like love.
26.
Experience in

the

group

fills

out

the

social

predisposition

in

somewhat the same way as xvater fills out a sponge.

In

order

for the individual to have a concept of xvhat he himself

is, the individual has inherited a predispostion for the self xvhich in
turn needs experience to fill it out. This predisposition
found in emotions or feelings.

The emotion or feeling of self may be regarded as
instinctive,
and
was
doubtless
evolved
in
connection
with
its
important
function
in
stimulating and unifying the special activites of
individuals.
It is, perhaps, to be thought of as
a more general instinct, of which anger, etc., are
differentiated forms, rather than as standing by
itself.
It is thus very profoundly rooted in the
history of
the
human
race
and
apparently
indispensible to any plan of life at all similar to
ours.
It seems to exist in a vague though
vigorous form at the birth of each individual, and
like other instinctive ideas or germs of ideas, to
be defined and developed by experience, become
associated, or rather incorporated, xvith muscular,
visual, and other sensations; xvith perceptions,
apperceptions, and conceptions of every degree of
complexity and of infinite variety of content; and
expecially, with personal ideas. 27.

is

to be
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It

seems

that he

is

claiming that consciousness or the mind is an

inherited aptitude, predisposition or instinct xvhich
through experience.
of

biological

is

given value

It seems to be a logical sequence xvhen one thinks

development

yet it is not a concept to be accepted by

many theorists. For them, the consciousness transcends the biological
and instincts.

...exist...refers to the being xvhich man
conquered by transcending and living. 28.

has

Tie
individual is produced by the biological
generic process; it is born and it dies.
But
personality is not generated, it is created by
God
29.
Cooley's concept of the "inherited self" is not the
that

others xvould attack.

only

concept

For David L. Miller the xvhole underlying

thesis in Cooley's conception is xvrong.

Every xvorthy and significant change that is planned
and deliberately undertaken in a society has its
origin
on
the
mind of an individual.
The
individual--not the community, not public opinion,
not external environmental forces--is the source of
new ideas that enable society to make changes for
the achievement of ideals
30.
Any human society, however primitive, is maintained
by the intentions of its member maintain it
Any human society is a moral entity. 31.
The

xvhole concept

of autonomous individuals in the xvorks of Popper,

Kant, Bentham and Adler are in fierce opposition to Cooley's theory.

159

Yet Cooley has some

indications

of

support.

Reinhold

Neibuhr

claims that

The
individual
draxvs
the sustenance
self-conscious individuality from
his
relation to his social group
32.

of his
organic

And:
It is the function of reason to relate life to life
in terms of harmony. 33.
In other

xvords, reason

has

an

adaptive function.

In another

fascinating little book, Sebastian de Grazia xvrites that xvhile systems
of beliefs are transmitted culturally and not biologically,
rooted

in man's prolonged childhood dependence and infirmity, and for

all intents and purposes, "they might as xvell be
the

genes.

In many

ways

transmitted

through

systems of beliefs may be likened to the

social heredity of the species Homo Sapiens." 34. William
speaks

they are

of psychobiological

as

instincts

and

McDougall

sentiments

of

individual person preparing him for his social relationships.
be admitted, hoxvever, that none are as strong in the claims

the

It must

toxvard a

collectivity as Cooley was.

What does all of the above mean?
point,

that

the purpose

of

I must remind the reader at this

section txvo and three xvas to provide a

description of a possible alternative to the more commonly

held viexv
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of

the

individual

society.

as

the basic human unit i.e.

To defend Cooley's viexvs xvould require

the basic unit of
effort, time and

space, all of xvhich cannot be granted in this thesis.
indicate

the possible harmony betxveen the

I can, hoxvever,

theories of Cooley and of

those discussed in the previous section.

In the previous section,

I had

described

hoxv the

"biological

xvhole" or "life- moment" could be considered the basic human unit and
hoxv as part of its identity, it was already a
not

be

for

and

could

thought of otherwise. Such a unit xvould require an inherited

or genetic "orientation" toxvard
theory

"community"

of

the

the

"biological

whole" and

Jung's

"collective unconscious" provided an excellent avenue

transmission

predispostion

the

from

of

one

an

inherited

generation

to

genetic

orientation

another. Feelings emotions,

instincts, archetypes etc. xvere the functional means to implement
"orientation".

Hoxvever, all

unconscious) and

contents were not described, although it xvas described as rooted

in, encircled by, permeated by the collective unconscious
it

the

this involved only the unconscious and

biological levels. Tie consciousness (and personal
its

or

tentatively emerged.

The community xvas the matrix, the foundation

and guide for the consciousness.
conscious psyche
found.

that

from xvhich

direction

Jung

stated

intention

that

and

it

is

in the

purpose xvere to be

It is by using Cooley's theory and Rof's theory that I hope to

describe the personal psyche and its contents.
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For Cooley, the personal psyche is filled through communication by
the inherited culture of the groups of xvhich he is a part. The xvhole
mind

of

the

individual:

individual

is

created

by

forces not directed by the

the inherited genetic predispositions, and the

social mind.

Tie individual mind is part of a greater social xvhole.

The social mind is fed into the personal psyche during
childhood

by

as

the

the

family,

the

individual, and
play-group

neighborhood or community of elders.
notion

the prolonged

the primary organic groups i.e. they are fundamental in

forming the social nature of
groups

xvhich he

calls

"primary

for

consist

ties

are

of

such

children, and

35. Fromm has

a

very

the

similar

ties" 36. xvhich are organic in the

sense that they are a part of normal human development.
such

inherited

Examples

of

the child and mother, the tribal man and the clan and

nature, the medieval man and the church or social caste. Hoxvever, for
Fromm these are ties
individual.

to

be

broken

for

self-actualization

Rof's viexv is closer to that of Cooley.

of

37. He claimed

that the child's earliest dispositon is affected or modified
reactions

he

awakens

vice-versa, a process
premature

at

in

by

calls
is

"urdimbre".

particularly

Because man

susceptable

In

individual
conscious

this he
emerged

finally

followed

from

the

matures

Jung's

is so

to "tutelar

imprints". Rof's "urdimbre" processes continue xvell into the
years.

the

the mother or another guardian figure and

he

birth, he

the

teenage

example xvho claimed that the

collective

in

stages

and

that

the

in the chaos caused by puberty. 38. For
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Cooley there is no emergence of the individual consciousness from
social mind.
individual's

Instead,
life

and

the

the "urdimbre" process continues through the
the

individual

awakens

reactions

in

his

communications and vice-versa.

There

are indications that the brain structure itself is affected

by the tutelar process. Kittens kept in cages with either
or

vertical

bars

alone are unable to see lines corresponding to the

missing bars in later life--i.e., kittens
bars

only xvill be

Children

unable

to

are knoxvn to have

connections

horizontal

a

from

cages xvith vertical

see horizontal lines and so on. 39.
far

greater

number

of

synaptic

in the brain in the first txvo years of life but will lose

almost half of them after two years. This

no

doubt

helps

them

to

learn but what is not used is lost. Abraham H. Masloxv indicates that
the learning process itself may affect the sturcture of the brain.

Habits are then conservative mechanisms, as James
long ago pointed out. Why is this so? For one
thing, because any learned reaction, merely by
existing, blocks the formation of other learned
reactions to the same problem.
But there is
another reason, just as important, but ordinarliy
neglected by the learning theorists, namely, that
learning is not only of muscular responses but of
affective preferences as xvell. Not only do xve
learn to speak English but xve learn to like and
prefer it. Learning is not then a completely
neutral process. 40.
Masloxv xvas interested in behavior and saxv only limits to other forms
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of behavior.

Hoxvever, should

the

brain

be more

plastic

than xve

thought, then the learning process through xvhich the "stream of life"
is absorbed places an indelible synaptic print on the brain.
be

impossible

for

anyone

It may

taught to speak English, an atomistically

oriented language to viexv the xvorld more holistically, as someone xvho
xvas taught

another

language xvould: perhaps an agglutinate language

which reflects a holistic xvorld viexv.

Whether or not

the

actual

brain

structure

is

affected,

the

personal unconscious certainly is. This part of the psyche, according
to Jung, requires experience for
xvithin the parameters
face-to-face

set

encounters

by
or

development and substance, but only

the

"collective

communications

unconscious"..
moulds

The

the personal

unconscious and provides it xvith attitudes, values, needs, drives,
principles, a code of ethics, etc. which in turn affect the conscious.
The

psychological

the

"result

of

intimate

individualities
common

life

effect

in

and

a

of the primary groups on the individual as
association...is

a

certain

fusion

of

common whole, so that one's very self...is the

purpose

of

the

group".

41.

That

such

a

"conditioning" occurs can be demonstrated by the effect a glimpse of a
xvoman's ankle caused in my great- grandfather's time and in my oxvn; or
the

effect

of

crunching

sheeps eyes xvhile eating or of cooking the

brains of someone you knoxv. A
culturally

induced

unconscious.

and

physical

reaction

sets

in

that

is

the agent of such a reaction is the personal
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So far, my description of the human has been heavily
as

such involved the genetic or

collective

social

psyche permeate

the

Both

occurs

former

is

layers

of

the

unconscious

Jung

indicates

that

the

same

in the unconscious psyche and in the conscious. When

xve are asleep, for
awareness

example, or mesmerized,
seems

restricted yet the psyche
sleepwalkers work at

Cooley

The

conscious and dominate it to a large extent yet

most people recognize its existence.

conscious

inheritance.

later experiential, but both are found as a xvhole in the

mind or psyche of the individual.

process

function betxveen

unconscious, a biological inheritance, and the social

culture or "stream of life", a
innate, the

and

the biological heredity of man. Tie

personal unconscious is the adaptive and mediating
the

organic

said

to withdraxv
continues

to

the

consciousness

into

itself

exist

and

or

or is greatly
to

act.

Some

a desk and produce excellent and complex xvork.

above

that

the

self

is:

a

feeling or emotion;

instinctive in nature; and, a functional attribute evolved in order to
stimulate and unify the special activities of the individual.
instinctive
and

idea,

deals with

perceptions

"muscular, visual, and

apperceptions

does:

ideas."

an

it has to be "defined and developed by experience"

and

other

conceptions

sensations;
of

complexity and of infinite variety of content; and,
personal

As

43.

Jung

has

every

xvith

degree

of

expecially, xvith

a similar viexvpoint about xvhat it

"Consciousness seems to stream into us from outside in the form
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of sense- perceptions, xve see, hear, taste, and smell the xvorld, and
so

are conscious of the xvorld."

It also is involved in the processes

of apperception, recognition, evaluation, volition
Apperception

and

intuition.

and recognition (identification) involve the function of

thinking; evaluation also involves the function of feeling;
is

the "perception

of

the possibilities

originating in the unconscious; and

volition

inherent
is

intuition

in a situation

directed

impulses,

based on apperception. Apperceptive processes may be either directed,
e.g.

"attention", or undirected--e.g., day dreaming.

rational the latter are irrational.
speak

of

attribute.
awareness

the

conscious

as

Consciousness, as
of

44.

The former are

Jung, hoxvever, does not

an evolved or inherited disposition or
a psychological

term,

involves

an

ideas aid feelings, particularily the capacity to knoxv,

to perceive, or arrange ideas aid feelings in order to have meaning.
Jacques Monod

believes

evolutionary biological

that

the

capacity

development.

is

Charles

the

S.

result

Peirce

"consciousness" as follows:

...consciousness in sometimes used to signify the
"I think", or unity in thought; but that unity is
nothing but consistency, or the recognition of it.
45.
And:
A reasoning
must
be
conscious;
and
this
consciousness is not mere "immediate consciousness,
" xvhich...is simple feeling viewed from another
side, but is in its ultimate nature...a sense of
taking a habit, or dispostion to respond to a given
king of stimulus in a given king of xvay. 46.

of

an

dismissed
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Sigmund

Freud

defined

consciousness

that reacts to the outside xvorld and in
modified

and

xvithin. 47.

reacting

to both

However,

environments, and

is

all

there

the

as that part of the psyche

a

continuing

outside

organisms
any

interplay,

is

xvorld and the changes

"interact"

xvith

their

reason xvhy the more complex the

organism is, the more complex the mechanism of "interaction" xvould be?
To "be Axvare", to "perceive", to "apprehend" and to
functions

respond", but

Consciousness

is not

identify

external

the human conscious.

aid

the

and

to

internal

that

presented

to

such a number of fine decisions or judgements to make, that

the aiimals had to control their
requires

habit

M. R. A. Chance postulated

that the ancestors of man had such a variety of stimuli
them

"a

a complex communal interaction. It is the intensity of

the directed mediation betxveen the
to

are

of consciousness, yet some animals have all functions (to a

more limited extent than man).

seems

"comprehend"

the

evolvement

of

emotional
enlarged

responses, such

neo-cortex.

control

It xvas this

anatomical development that allowed the human to evolve. 48. Chance's
theory provides a nice foundation for the concept

expressed

Dubos:

...social groups; like individual persons, never
react passively with environmental
situations;
instead they respond in a purposive manner. It has
long
been
recognized...that
the
growth
of
civilization
is
favoured
by
variable
and
challenging
environments--whether the challenge
comes from topographic, climatic or social stimuli.
43.

by Rene
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Consciousness can be conceived as an inherited biological function
which responds to stimuli in a "purposive manner" yet the
of

both parts

of the unconscious in the conscious severly restricts

yet ignites the conscious functions.
individual

can

solve

Should

a problem

found

the

themes

arise, the

it if he is patterned to think along the lines

necessary for solution; and if his personal unconscious
or

permeations

has

absorbed

of intuitive understanding in the social mind.

Masloxv indicated that language tends to adopt a certain

view

of

the

xvorld which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for an individual
to think of an opposite

or more

simply

another

viexvpoint.

Clyde

Kluckhohn adds that many discoveries and inventions are made available
to a group either as creations of their oxvn members or as trade goods.
"Hoxvever, only those that fit the total immediate situation in meeting
the

group's needs

for

survival

or

in promoting the psychological

adjustment of individuals xvill become part of the culture." 50.

Each

culture has its oxvn set of trends of thought or set of predispositions
to thought.

It

is

the

usual

case

to

describe

the

individual and society caused by the poxver of
force

the

tension betxveen the

the

larger

entity

to

individual to conform and the struggle the individual has

to maintain to be free. Freud paints a picture of ai ego that must be
strengthened until it
society.

is

able

to xvithstand

the

assaults

of

the

I believe, hoxvever, that a case can be made that the cause
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of tension in a society is not that of the individual to remain
nor

that

of

the

individual

free,

who has remained totally a part of the

xvhole (some tribesmen are unable to even think of the

self, but

are

nevertheless happy).

The tension comes xvhen the individual has become

more

of

isolate, more

an

individual.

Of

psyche, one is collective by difinition; a

the three parts of the

second

is basically

the

creation of the collective in a locus; and the third, is the other txvo
parts

in and through it, as the ground of its existence and the poxver

for its actions. When the third part, consciousness, represses
other

the

txvo and becomes more individually oriented, an unhealthy psyche

is created,
breakdoxvn

feelings of anomie and alienation are the

or

results

of a

disruption of the harmony of the psyche, the process of

life or the process of the "life-stream".

People begin to lose their

grip on the human as they become more individualized.

The

human

determined.

Cooley

organization.
in

the

collectivity, hoxvever,
indicated

is not

static,

or

that each person xvas nexv, was a fresh

Variation is the norm of the collective

individual minds.

fixed

social

entity

This variation is not great for it falls

xvithin the given social set and xvithin the given social momentum.

Tie

social inheritance that xve have is rippling, alxvays responding to

the

biological

development

of man,

to

environmental

changes, and to

changes in technological principles (i.e., the electric toothbrush had
a minimal affect, if any, on the social process, yet the computer

did
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because

of

the nexv principle of high-speed knoxvledge involved).

changes are tentative and meet
changes

easily

fierce

resistance

they

are

accomadated by the existing social process (nexv stars

on television, or more efficient gasoline).
the basic

unless

Tie

nature

of man.

This resistance

involves

To make a drastic change in society xvould

mean a change in the genetic pattern of man; to make a change of great
but of lesser importance may mean a mere change in the xvhole psyche of
the

human, each

revolution

in

and

every

individual.

The

reformation xvas

thought and viexvpoint, yet before Luther stood defying

both the council of the church and the Emperor, four or
years

of

a

five hundred

preparation had occurred. 51. The problem at this point is

to account for change. For this I must

present

the

thought

of

a

Spanish humanist and synthesizer of the thought of Freud, and Jung and
of biology.

Juan Rof

Carballo

has xvritten extensively on psycho-biology and

neuro-physiology and has been hailed as the first major psychoanalytic
critic of the society and culture of his native

Spain.

In

creating

his biological aid anthropological models, he introduces the theory of
"urdimbre".

A

Spanish

English, it is usually
"weave",

xvord

that has no similar xvord or concept in

translated

or "plot" (as in a story).

as

"xveb", "netxvork", "texture",

Rof confuses the meaning for the

English reader further by expanding and adapting the original
concept.

Spanish
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"Urdimbre"
the

dynamic

reduced

as

a

theory, involves the child and the parents, and

and mutually

the parents

to

modifying

relationship

involved.

(Rof

the mother but I have included the father.)

Rof defined "urdimbre" as "a texture of transactional

and

reciprocal

influences betxveen mother and child from the moment of birth." 52. It
is not

a

dialectical

nor

a

deterministic process but a "circular

process xvhich does not permit prediction or an a priori conception

of

xvhich factors in the transaction will be decisive." 53. According to
Rof, human

beings

are most

susceptible

to

"transactional

and

programming

influences" because, unlike other higher animals, man is

notably premature at birth.

"Urdimbre" processes are conditioned by genetic factors
specific functions and characteristics.

but have

It is "programmatic" i.e., it

equips the child xvith a set pattern of behavioxir; it is "psychosocial"
because

it

determines

the unconscious mechanisms that appear in the

individual's choices in friendship, marriage, career etc.; and
"transmissional"

whereby

cultural

patterns

generation to generation and presents to the
tradition.

are

passed

individual

it

on

a

is

from

sense of

These are accomplished by three main "urdimbre" processes

that occur at a fairly set time in the development of the personality
of

the

child

development).
for

character

(reminiscent

of

Chomsky's

theory

of

Tie primary "urdimbre" process provides the

language

foundation

formation and is "xvoven" in the first fexv months after
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birth.

Tie "urdimbre" of order co-exists xvith the first process

becomes
child

prominent

develops

organizes
occurs

a

in

in the fourth or fifth year.

or

absorbs

hierarchical

social

norms

for

the

adolescence, wherein

the

child

self-image" xvith the

image

others

By this process, the

aid moral

xvorld

but

child.

patterns

and

The final process

must

"confront

his

have of him in order for him to

develop a mature personality.

I have presented Rof's concept of "urdimbre" in some detail for I
xvish to take that same concept and expand it. Above I have indicated
a

gap betxveen the primative

"life-moment"

and

society.

What

and

the

culture

of

the

Toennies and Maritain fail miserably to

explain how such txvo distinct
"merge".

community

concepts

xvith such

divergent

roots

has occurred between the time of the Tribes of Israel

and the time of the State of Israel so that man separated

by

four

evolve) so

thousand

years, could

change

(I

do not

say

a mere

drastically? What separates man from a primitive tribe and man

from

Toronto or Helsinki? Marx and Engels explain it as folloxvs:
Some

elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few

epochs.

The most modern period xvill have

common.

Pro- duction xvithout them is inconceivable.

the most

highly

certain

from

in

But although

developed languages have laxvs and categories in

common with the most primitive languages, it
divergence

categories

is precisely

their

the general and common features xvhich constitute

their development. 54.
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It

xvas ai

laiguages

arrogant

of

some

assumption.

Studies

since have

shoxvn that

tribesmen are as sophisticated (perhaps even more

sophisticated in many

areas) as

any

Indo-European

language.

In

another place, Marx postulates the folloxving:
... the "entire so-called history of the world" is nothing but the
creation of man through human labour.55.
And:
In broad

outline xve can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the

feudal, and

the modern

bourgeois modes

of

production

as

progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. 56.
The

latter

is a theme that Almond and Verba xvould have approved.

Man develops through various stages in an almost predetermined pattern
-for Marx, an economic pattern. As man's
transcending

of

course, has

more primitive cultures.
Brazil

and

creative

or

labour lifts economic man from one epoch to another, his

society evolves and advances with
America),

purpose

him.

Western

Europe

(and

North

evolved further along the path than other

I recall that a primitive

Indian

tribe

in

xvas taken out of the jungle and introduced to "civilization."

Not recognizing the superiority of the Europeanized culture, xvithin a
few years they returned to the jungle to avoid or stem the corruption
of their people.

As mentioned before, Barrington Moore, Jr., does not believe
"societies"

aid man

evolve

in

a similar manner.

that

For instance, he
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develops four distinct patterns of change from the pre-industrial
the

industrial

xvorld. The Democratic-capitalist pattern can be seen

in France, England, and the U.S., yet each had
societies

at

the

starting

"profoundly

point" but xvent through

different
"bourgeois

revolutions" xvith different alignments of "class" players.
feudal

to

societies

lend

themselves

to

democratic

For

him,

development;

bureaucratic agrarian societies (Russia, China, Egypt) lend themselves
to bureaucratic and undemocratic development.57.

In other words, our

society has developed from original societal types and they from prior
societies until xve reach the very primitive units.

Tie

diversity

of man's development, from the stone age tribes of

the Philippines to the "punk rockers" of our
not

indicate

"Atlantic"

culture, do

any predetermined pattern of development, or even that

every society xvill or ought to develop. Yet processes of
have

occurred.

Tie

introduction

of

the

consequences for the North American Indian. The
xvheel, of

achievement s

concepts, drives, principles

communal, have not chaiged.
are

development

profound
of

the

profound

results.

The

of man have been involved in the process

leading to the development of our present
many

had

iron, of money, etc., have had enormous consequences. The

development of one god by the Jexvs also had
intellectual

horse

development

political

societies.

etc., particularly

Technological

and

social

engineering

Yet
and

advances

countless. Advances in food gathering (e.g. agriculture, fishing
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etc.,) and transportation have not been as startling or
Advances

in

as numerous.

social relations (ethics, morals etc.,) xvould be hard to

discover, let alone demonstrate. As a result, Plato is still relevent
yet Ptolymy is not. Aquinas still
Reginbald

of Cologne

is

an

challenges

the

intellect, xvhile

obscure footnote in an equally obscure

book. 58. Tie "hard" sciences have had amazing success; astronomical
compared

to

the

social

sciences

or "soft" sciences. Noam Chomsky

claims that such lopsided advances in certain areas
the

result

of

a

of

endeavor

are

genetic pattern of thinking. 59. We are unable to

make advances in certain areas because xve do not have the capacity
go

to

outside the inherited set pattern of our brain. Kant's categories

are another example of a set pattern of thinking.

Hoxvever, two things must be admitted.
resulting in innovations.
pattern

is not

Man

or

technological advances of the brass

fixed.
and

cities xvithout xvheels, iron, or

Hoxvever, once

does

think

uniform

discovered

and

Some tribes accepted the

iron

settle in fixed areas (e.g., Afgan nomads).

been

and

Secondly, man's thinking xvithin his genetic

pre-determined

progress" have not

can

ages

their

adopted,

refused

Tie

discovery

these

"advances
or

advances

"urdimbre"

-

i.e.,

the process

of

adoption.
have

been

fundamentally incorporated into the v/oof and xvarp of the process of
social

to

Others built magnificent

brass, etc.
in

but

of civilization.

a

(For the

moment, I xvish to use "civilization" and "urdimbre" synonymously.)
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Society cannot be formed directly from the
fundamental

communities

intolerant of change.
example

of

a

unchanging

or

at

for

least

basic

extremely

Society (and xve can use the "state" as a prime

societal

capable of rapid change
hundred

are

community,

institution) changes rapidly or at least is
and

the

state

throughout

years has suffered many changes.

the

last

three

Society, rooted in the more

rational or purposive part of man, is an artifact - a modification
xvhat already
values.

is - nature, use or design knoxvledge, needs, ideas, and

It is never a

artifact.

static

artifact

nor

is

it

ever

the

same

Each society is uniquely modified from or in a dynamic and

on going process
reflecting

of

of

civilization.

No

society

can

exist

without

not only the community and nature, but also the innovative

advaices and

the

accepted

ideas

of

its historical

past.

These

reflections are never pre-determined because society is based on, even
created by, the process of civilization.

A

fallaigist

architectural theorist, Gimenez Caballero, xvrote in

his Arte y_ Estado that the city "is the point of balance
individual

and

society".

60.

(The

Spanish

interested in mathematical, particularly

betxveen the

Fallangists xvere very

geometrical, theories

and

applications, hence the "point of balance" concept.) If one does not
accept that the "point of balance" is static or fixed, then the city,
more

than

any other creation of man, reflects the dynamic, circular,

reciprocal, traisactional process betxveen man and

his

society.

Nexv
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innovations are discovered and adopted more readily in cities than any
xvhere else.

Society

needs

cities or has needed cities in the past

xvith fexv exceptions (e.g., perhaps the feudal age).

Cities alloxv for

institutions

laxvs; for

and

fixed

objective

rules

or

communications; for specialized divisions of labour; etc., a
of

things

that

seem

social institutions.

to provide

rapid

variety

fertile ground for innovation and

Philip Rieff makes this comment:

As cultures change, so do the modal types of
personality that are their bearers.... Yet a
culture survives principally, I think, by the poxver
of its institutions to bind and loose men in the
conduct of their affairs xvith reasons which sink so
deep into the self that they become commonly aid
implicitly understood - xvith that understanding of
which explicit belief and precise knowledge of
externals xvould show outxvardly like the tip of an
iceberg. 61.

Hoxvever, this

is but

a part

of the process xvhich in turn had

created the institutions, xvhich changes or modifies
will

supercede

them.

Culture

urdimbre

his

book, Cultural

indicates

or

that

institution

created

by

civilization process. For example, John U. Nef, in
Foundations

of

Industrial

Civilization

62

there xvere txvo distinct early industrial processes in

Europe as a result of
thought.

and xvhich

itself, xvhich Rieff considers as the

primary "stuff" of social interaction, is an
the

them

Because

of

both

conscious

and

unconscious

patterns

economic, political, religious, and

institutions, an industrial process

favouring

quality

and

of

social

artistic
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endeavors arose in France xvhich xvas aided by conscious policies of the
French

crown.

As

a

result

of

dissimilar patterns set by similar

institutions in Britain and Holland, an industrial
quantity

and

production

xvas formed.

process

The institutions, in turn, had

their patterns set by xvar or lack of it, innovations or
them,ideas, values

dynamic

or

social

and

values

continuous

It

and society.

the

environmental

reciprocally

fashion,xveaving

environmental values into a new
xvhole.

the

lack of

institutions, accidents, etc., in previous times.

Tnere xvas a process in which
mental

favouring

influenced
the

values
each

various

and

the

other in a
social

and

ongoing interaction, into a continual

is an "urdimbre process" which involves the xvhole culture
Tie unconscious psyche is in constant mutually modifying

relationship xvith the conscious, purposive psyche acting on the xvorld.
The

human psyche

(non-social

takes

environment)

solutions, and
perception, and

into

itself

in order

to maintain
apperception

itself
of

the

surrounding

environment

to cope xvith problems to provide
in

a hostile

xvorld.

By

its

the world, and by the unconscious

psyche's "patterning" the human is able to adapt itself to change.
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